# AT: Baudrillard

## Cyberian Islands Case Neg

### Crimsonia = Russia

#### NATO’s cyberwar games clearly intend for Crimsonia to resemble Russia.

Senker 16(Cath Senker, Cath Senker is a writer of non-fiction for children on diverse subjects such as history, world religions, and the environment. In 2018, she won the Educational Writers' Award, 12 September 2016, Cyber Crime and the Dark Net: Revealing the hidden underworld of the internet)

The imaginary country Berylia (rather similar to Estonia) has been hit by a cyber assault on its drone manufacturer. The anonymous attackers are probably linked to Berylia’s enemy **Crimsonia (very like Russia).** They seek the laters cyber.

More evidence.

Journeyman 18(Film transcripts from “Estonia: Cyber War Games”, May 8 2018, Journeyman Pictures, <https://www.journeyman.tv/film/7340>, https://www.journeyman.tv/film\_documents/7340/transcript/)

The CCDCOE has been running Locked Shields every year since 2010 with a similar scenario: the fictional country of Crimsonia which seeks to dominate the region launches a massive cyber attack against the equally fictional Berylia. Berylia calls on its NATO allies for help. Although the scenario isn’t real, the **attacks** are meant to **mimic threats that are**, threat’s like **those NATO faces from** potentially hostile countries including **Russia.**

### **Crimsonia = Russia and China**

#### **Crimsonia is intended as a stand in for Russia AND China.**

Martin 21(Alexander Martin, Journalist of numerous journals focusing on technology based publications, April 13th 2021, Nato Prepares for world’s larget Cyber War game-with focus on grey zone, Sky News, https://news.sky.com/story/nato-prepares-for-worlds-largest-cyber-war-game-with-focus-on-grey-zone-12274488)

How does it work? Organised by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Tallinn, Estonia, the Locked Shields exercise is an annual network defence drill using real-world skills. The scenario is based on an attack on the fictional country of Berylia - hypothetically situated in the northern Atlantic - and an adversary called Crimsonia that is creating some artificial islands. Although the adversary is not mapped to a specific NATO adversary, **Crimsonia has traits of both Russia and China in its ambitions and conduct.** The idea is to test multiple teams' skills just as they would be tested if they were forced to remotely come to the aid of NATO ally Berylia as it is targeted by "a sophisticated and intense series of cyber attacks".

### Cyber War Games Good

#### Cyber Defense Exercises (CDX) are an effective tool to evaluate the effectiveness of defense systems and protect infrastructure

**Seker & Seker 20** (Seker, Ensar, and Kamile Nur Seker, Nato Researcher and Cyber Security Expert. "Cyber Defense Exercises (CDXs) as a Testbed for Cyber Security Assessments. June 2020)

CDXs are suitable platforms to test the IT and OT systems to be able to create better cyber security and cyber defense solutions. In this chapter, we will take a closer look to Locked Shields CDX to analyze how cyber exercises can be used as testbed environments. Lesson learned sections and evaluation of the exercise by all participants, can give ideas to cyber experts to improve and strengthen their security. So, it’s fair to say that CDXs can serve as excellent testbeds. Cyber experts from different fields who participate CDX can share their knowledge and experience each other via these exercises. Figure 3 shows a model for CDXs as a testbed.Locked Shields (LS) cyber defense exercise is organized annually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE). It’s accepted by the authorities that Locked Shields is the world's largest, most complex and technologically advanced cyber defense exercise. In Locked Shields, blue teams are created by the NATO member nations or NATO allied nations. So, it is an international cyber exercise in state level. Locked Shields could be a good example to show how CDX can be used as testbed. Figure 4, 5, 6 shows some statistics about LS CDX. Based on Figure 4, while there were 9 blue teams in 2012 LS CDX, the number was increased to 22 in 2018. In Figure 6, the number of participants to LS CDX also growth (250, 250, 300, 400, 550, 800, 1000 respectively) in same period. This means LS CDX was able to attract more nations and more cyber experts every year. According to Figure 5, numbers of virtual machines were increased dramatically from 25 to 4000 in 6 years. It means LS CDX is getting more advance and complicated each year. More than 1000 cybersecurity experts from around the world have been involved in the 2018 Locked Shields exercise and the national teams of 21 countries have participated as blue teams. The exercise involved around 4000 virtualized systems and more than 2500 attacks by the red team. LS CDX follows a successful route to adopting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The organizers of LS CDX succeeded in providing an interesting and complex environment for the blue teams to defend these against an intensive attack campaign. While blue teams can put their skills to test, they can also analyze and test new technologies in a safe and secure environment. In the context of LS13, the following areas were most challenging for the blue teams: Defending web applications. Detecting custom malicious code. Mitigating BGP hijacking attacks. Initiating efficient information sharing. In LS14, the most challenging areas are for blue teams: Filtering and detecting malicious traffic over IPv6. Monitoring for malicious WAN route changes and preventing BGP hijacking/man-in-the-middle. Protecting custom web applications. Finding pre-planted malicious programs and coping with RT‟s Anti-Virus evasion techniques (publicly available free tools were in most cases enough to evade AV solutions). Sharing actionable information with other blue teams. In 2015, new attack vectors included ICS/SCADA systems and Windows 8 and 10 operating systems, as well as an element of active defense. In 2017 the blue teams were tasked to maintain the services and networks of a military air base of a fictional country, which, according to the exercise scenario, experienced severe attacks on its electric power grid system, unmanned aerial vehicles, military command and control systems, critical information infrastructure components and other operational infrastructure. The size and scope of technologies, networks and devices used in Locked Shields 2017 has increased considerably – leading to more attacks and specialized systems involved. Specialized systems enable teams to practice the defense of systems that they are not working with on a regular basis. However, in the modern threat landscape incidents with specialized systems may potentially have a profound effect on a military mission or the entire society. In 2018, the attacks cause severe disruptions in the operation of the electric power grid, 4G public safety networks, drone operation and other critical infrastructure components. While the aim of the tech game is to maintain the operation of various systems under intense pressure, the strategic part should serve as a forum to understand the impact of decisions made at the strategic and policy level. When we analyze LS CDX, based on the statistics and After Action Reports (ARR), it can be said that, the exercise improved itself during the years and created a suitable testbed platform for cyber experts. Via this platform, professionals and decision makers in cyber were able to share their knowledge and experience with each other and test their defense skills and strategies against new technologies and new attacks. For future studies, a technical tool will be developed on the scoring system, which is a problematic issue for CDXs, and on the standardization of this system and the development of a fairer system. The integration of new technologies such as power grid systems and drone control systems into CDXs is a critical issue. With the integration of these special systems into the exercises, the existing problems and the methods to be followed are another work to be done in the future. The importance of defense exercises is increasing day by day. It would be possible for countries to be involved in the global cyber defense exercises in the international arena, spreading the development and implementation of their own CDX platforms on a national basis, and allocating higher budget figures to the planning and development of these exercises could contribute to achieving beneficial outcomes in the future to create stronger cyber defense systems. The emphasis on these exercises on the national and 18 international scene will provide benefits in terms of uncovering the vulnerabilities in the area of the cyberspace, as well as the revitalization of the cyber defense awareness, and also the integrated technologies that can be followed in exercises related to the cyber defense.

#### Data from cyber conflict modeling can be useful in research and development of new cyber defense technologies

**Granasen et al 19** (November 2019, Granåsen, Magdalena, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Huskaj, Gazmend, Swedish Defense University, Varga, Stefan, Royal Institute of Technology, “Data Collection and Research in CDXs: Command and Control, Cyber Situational Awareness and Intelligence Perspectives on Cyber Defense,” 24th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium)

The results showed that the data collected for the case study of the Swedish blue team during LS19 is meaningful and of sufficient quality for further analysis within the three research themes. Some issues concerning the quality of data were raised in the results section. These and other issues are further discussed in the current section. Concerning data quality, it can be concluded that data loss in the collected data will not impair the ability to conduct the analyses needed in order to explore the research themes C2 , CSA and intelligence. Analysis of different data sources in conjunction will be necessary in order to make sense of the data. The language in chat logs was sparse, and although the researcher is acquainted with the terminology used in these logs, it does not make sense until correlated with other information such as observations or published threat reports. As the exercise was organized by the CCDCOE, the research team only had part control of the data. This is the reason why data on the progress of threat reporting, score and network overview (available services) was collected through screenshots. It will be a time-consuming task to manually transfer these screenshots to a format that can be further analyzed. Still, the research team assessed that a screenshot of the information was better than not having access to this information at all. Using a well-established CDX such as Locked Shields for research is cost-efficient in that the scenario and scenario injects (including a 70-person red team), set-up, gamenet (including support personnel), communication infrastructure, participant invitation, scoring system, exercise control personnel and a lot of the administration already are in place. Furthermore, Locked Shields has gained a reputation that attracts very proficient cyber security experts, while it is likely that these people would not feel equally attracted to participate in a pure research experiment. From a Swedish perspective, one of the greatest benefits of participation in LS19 was the ability to meet and work with people from other organizations. Research within an international CDX clearly entails lack of experimental control and reduced access to data for the researchers, as well as continuous adjustments to fit the data collection to the exercise schedule. However, it also entails highly motivated, skilled and competitive participants, and a far more complex exercise environment than a normal research project would be able to finance. The initial results from the surveys indicated that the exercise as a whole seemed to have progressed smoothly, with positive ratings of teamwork, information sharing and strategy, as well as cyber situational awareness. The high performance score further emphasizes the success of the team. It is therefore clear that the case studied is well suited for analysis of how a successful team develops its strategy and what functional structures for coordination in a cyber defence team may look like. The participation of the research team can also be viewed as a success story. The team was engaged from the very beginning of the preparatory phase of the exercise. In this way, the researchers were able to learn contextual factors, such as the team leadership view on issues such as strategy and coordination, which may have affected the final outcome of the exercise, that were not necessarily written down or documented in any other way. The researchers were given the opportunity to describe their initial planning, which included the aim to be as non-intrusive as possible. This means that the data collection did not include any "freezes" in the exercise in order to collect data, neither were there any plans to collect excessive unnecessary amounts of data (video recordings, key-logging or screenshots). The research team explained their measures to preserve the participants’ anonymity (if this was requested). The nature of the meetings, e.g., personal interactions between exercise participants and the research team contributed to mutual trust and confidence building. The cordial relationship between the researchers and the participants probably contributed to the high survey response rates and a benevolent attitude to answering the questions. Having three persons in the research team meant a high workload, and an appreciation for that every team activity would not be observed. It should be noted that there could be a limit as to how many researchers are feasible for data collection to reduce the 16 risk of collecting too much data, duplicates of data, or disturbing the observed team. The inclusion of CSA-related questions in the team’s ordinary reporting procedure provided a less intrusive method for collecting SA-related data than if a traditional probing measure such as SAGAT or SART had been used. There was no indication of that the inference of SA-related questions in the internal reporting template disturbed the sub-teams. The internal reporting template was designed and administered by the reporting team, and the sub-teams were not aware of that some of the questions in the internal reporting template were induced by the research team. The research team may have positively affected the SA and even the performance in the team, in that they directed the team’s attention towards issues useful to include in the threat reports as well as for the understanding of the threats. This is, however, a risk with all data collection. For instance, the presence of observers may affect the behavior of the team, and the questions in the start-up survey may direct the team’s focus towards the issues mentioned in the survey. For integrity reasons as well as risk of data overload, the research team made a deliberate decision to not to capture network activity. It is assessed that network activity logs would produce a lot of data of which only a small part would be useful. Subsequently, a great deal of analysis would be required, and there would probably not be a great deal of added value for the research themes. For the current paper, a pluralist methodology [31] was employed, where different types of data were collected in order to address the research themes from several perspectives. It needs to be acknowledged that some data will almost always suffer from some data loss (for instance surveys), while other data is more complete, but requiring quite a lot of analytic effort and needing to be combined with other data in order to interpret it (i.e. communication logs). Some data is based on subjective assessment (surveys, observations). However who is best suited to assess the workload, if not those who are experiencing it? The pluralist approach finds answers in combinations and comparisons of data. The dataset will suit the analysis within all three research themes, and the same data items may be combined and analyzed in different ways to correspond to research questions within different themes. 6. Summary and Conclusions The objective of this paper was to explore the possibilities to collect meaningful data for research on Command and Control (C2 ) Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA), and Intelligence in conjunction with an interorganizational cyber defense team during a cyber defense exercise. The purpose of the data collection was to explore the possibilities to conduct research within these research areas. A variety of carefully selected data collection methods specifically tailored to suit the needs for relevant data for our research fields of interest was employed. Our research has shown that a CDX indeed provided a good opportunity to collect pertinent data to analyze Command and Control, Cyber Situational Awareness and Intelligence related research questions. The trove of collected data will be used to write papers according to our research themes. The working titles of some future papers in the works are: i) Exploring the development of coordination structures and strategy in a cyber defense team, ii) Acquiring Cyber Situational Awareness in a cyber defense team, and iii) Intelligence in support of a defensive cyberspace operation. The results obtained in this paper is further expected to be useful for refining data collection methods for CDXs.

## Baudrillard Indicts

#### Baudrillard’s logic is faulty, it doesn’t take into account the thing to be simulated is equally affected by the real. War games and planning aren’t simulations, they’re the same as war, no meaning is lost.

Von Hilgers 12 (Phillip, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University, Managing Director at Meetrics, “*War Games: A History of War on Paper*,” Chapter 4: Historiography in Real Time (2012), translated by Ross Benjamin, 6/23/22 - FI)

The Real of Simulations For a long time, media theories have burgeoned regarding how media seem to capture the world in simulations. The fact that media themselves are not based on virtualities but on realities — which even former radio officers occasionally find hard to master — is often overlooked. Thus sociologist Jean Baudrillard has elevated the simulacrum to the central concept for the description of the state of the Western world — without, however, asking about the historical development of the simulation. For Baudrillard, simulacra have, in an escalating fashion, first taken up the play with the real, then taken the place of its appearances, and finally themselves created a basis that is no longer dependent on the real. 32 In particular, the referential system of the image has thereby undergone a transformation that leads from reflection to self-referentiality. 33 The logic of this interpretation, however, implies that the real is excluded from the simulation media and their history is effaced. But it is precisely the development of war games that shows how much the real intrudes into the simulation media, which is the case whenever the simulation reaches its limit and suffers disturbances. The thing to be simulated is equally affected by the intrusion of the real, even if it sometimes takes on the technical forms of the simulation. In particular, effects of the real emerge at the communicative and mediatic level. In the military political war game, a Prussian legation councilor ’ s ability to empathize might underlie the position of the Polish foreign minister. However, the communication practices that are thereby tested could not be more real. It is in the war game that the difference between simulation and communication comes most clearly to light. Though infantry units in the war game that do not shoot with live ammunition — or if they do, then only at targets — and tank battalions that operate, in the absence of available tanks, with mockups or entirely on paper exclude a world of real pitfalls from the outset, their signal battalions do not proceed any differently in the war game than in war: “ The headquarters or the command post is set up in houses, in the open, in vehicles or tents. The signals personnel set up the required wire and radio connections so that during the exercise the entire communications operation including the messengers proceeds as in a war. ” 34 To make the situation appear to the remaining battalions “ as in a war, ” recourse could be had to an old alliance between the film industry and the military. It should be recalled that the chief of the supreme army command, Erich Ludendorff, had already founded Universal-Film AG (UFA) in 1917 for propaganda and psychological warfare. The war game, however, made use not of film ’ s contents but of its production methods — indeed, so much so that the general of the signal corps, Praun, would use the word “ film ” as a synonym for “ war game ” : “ Mostly the director [of the war game] will have assembled his ‘ insertions ’in a sort of ‘ screenplay, ’according to which the film then proceeds. ” 35 “ Insertions ”are measures undertaken by the war game director during meticulous plans in the run-up to the game or at the same point through the deployment of intercept companies so as to confront the war game participants with exceptional situations on the one hand and optimize one ’ s own signals intelligence on the other hand. 36 The borrowings from film thereby serve a form of psychological warfare that is not directed against opponents but subjects one ’ s own battalions to stress tests: The staff must be occupied constantly in a warlike form, thus to some extent put under pressure. It is therefore the main art of the director to generate realistically the numerous “ frictions ”that occur continuously in war. The director must have prepared these well in the form of “ insertions. ”Among these are the abundance of reports that amass, especially during critical situations, false reports, “ rumors, ”outof-date orders and reports, deceptive communications, wishes of the neighbors, inquiries of higher-ranking command posts — these should rain down on the staff and force the participants day and night to make swift evaluations and discern the essential. Among the countless individual events of war are wire faults, unintelligible telegraphs and radio reports, decoding missions, prisoner interrogations, evaluation of aerial images, assessments of the enemy demanded by superior posts, supplying missions. A captured enemy map with writing in a foreign language can also perplex the responsible specialists. Such specialists, or individual commanders or a whole section of the staff can be completely or temporarily lost in the decisive moment, while the staff operation must continue as in a case of emergency ( Ernstfall). Such losses, caused by direct hits, paratroopers or partisans, then force the remaining staff to instructive assistance. 37

#### Their theory of simulation is wrong and baseless nonsense - Reality exists

**Schwabach 3** (Aaron Schwaback @ Jefferson School of Law - Professor of Law and Director of Center for Global Legal Studies, J.D., University of California at Berkeley Published : 2003, <jonah> <IKS> “Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law,” DOA: 7-8-16, pages 1-21)

Baudrillard presents fewer problems of interpretation; his word is simulacrum (simulacre), which he uses in more or less the same sense, albeit with more elaboration, that it is ordinarily used.10 Academics are often criticized for over-reliance on opaque jargon. In comparison to many of his compatriots and their American emulators, Baudrillard indulges in jargon only sparingly. For the most part, he **writes the most arrant nonsense** in a clear, readily accessible style. His basic point is that the Gulf War was not a war but the simulacrum of a war; it happened not on the battlefield but on television. All of the traditional trappings of the buildup to war were presented, even grotesquely exaggerated, on television; at the end, however, we (the audience) were deprived of the final battle, left with neither victory for the Allies nor defeat for Saddam Hussein. In light of the bold promise of the book’s title, this is rather disappointing. Rather than arguing unequivocally that the entire war was a fraud perpetrated upon the television-viewing public, Baudrillard is simply **nattering on** again about simulacra. (At one point, though, he does suggest that “[o]ne is reminded of Capricorn One,” a movie about a government conspiracy to fake a Mars landing in a film studio and present it to the public as news.)11 Baudrillard, after all, is a man who, like his compatriot and predecessor Descartes, spends an inordinate amount of time wondering whether he exists. Unlike Descartes, however, he is not convinced that he exists merely because he thinks that he does. His identity, and that of everything and everyone else, is **lost in a kaleidoscope of endlessly precessing simulacra** that ultimately preclude the existence of any baseline reality. The Gulf War is not then real or unreal in any absolute sense, because there is no ultimate “reality.” It is simply less real than some things and more real than others. (Baudrillard draws many comparisons between “events” in the war and television commercials, for example.) The Gulf War (or simulacrum of war) is thus at least as real as international law, and by extension so is the Kosovo war; I shall therefore have to continue writing about all three. Baudrillard begins by asserting that “It might have been supposed that the defection of the Eastern Bloc would have opened up new spaces of freedom for war by unlocking deterrence. Nothing of the sort[.]”12 Baudrillard, writing these words at the beginning of 1991,13 was **simply too impatient**. As the world has since learned to its dismay, the defection of the Eastern Bloc and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has opened up a great number of new spaces of freedom for war, most notably in the expression of the ethnic conflicts previously repressed by authoritarian Communist regimes. Baudrillard himself would undoubtedly deplore the idea that the facts of his life might be responsible for his opinions. But his reactions on such topics as America and superpower conflict (and, as we shall see later, Arabs and Islam) are often surprisingly conventional for a person of his age, gender and nationality. Baudrillard was born in Reims in 1929.14 He would thus have been three or four years old when Hitler came to power, fifteen during the liberation of France, and sixteen when World War II ended. The bilateral Allied/Axis conflict was almost immediately replaced with a similar conflict between the more or less free-market countries of the West and the communist countries of the Soviet bloc. As a result, it is perhaps natural that Baudrillard would see a world with two opposing ideological camps as a prerequisite for war, or at least for war of the sort to which he is accustomed. At the time of communism’s collapse, he found it difficult to believe in the possibility of war in a post-Soviet world. By the time Baudrillard opined that the collapse of the Eastern bloc had opened up no new spaces of freedom for war, in fact, Croatia and Slovenia had already begun to make secessionist noises; six months later the first of Yugoslavia’s ethnic cleansing wars would begin. The Romanian revolution (or its simulacrum) had already taken place, as Baudrillard repeatedly acknowledges, after his fashion. 15 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait could have been designed as a test case for the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world, as the first major act of territorial aggression in which the response of the Soviet Union (which itself would not last out the year) was more or less insignificant. Thus, simulacrum or not, the Gulf War was important historically. Baudrillard himself says, somewhat inconsistently in light of his other conclusions, that “what is at stake in this one is war itself: its status, its meaning, its future.”16 Much of what strikes Baudrillard as different about the Gulf War, though, is actually not new at all. For example, he sees the role of hostages as one of the Gulf War’s novel qualities: “The hostage has taken the place of the warrior. He has become the principal actor, the simulacral protagonist, or rather, in his pure inaction, the protagoniser of non-war.”17 Later, in Kosovo, the Serbian government would make an entire civilian population hostage. Yet the use of hostages in war, even on this scale, is hardly new; warring parties have always viewed hostages “as exchange value and liquidity.”18 Using hostages as human shields and bargaining chips is **as old as war itself**. It is when Baudrillard likens the plight of the audience to the plight of the hostages, though, that he begins to **exhibit the indifference to human suffering** for which he has so often been criticized.19 He writes that “all of us [are] information hostages on the world media stage….20 We are already all strategic hostages in situ; our site is the screen on which we are virtually bombarded day by day, even while serving as exchange value.”21 It is this element of the concept of simulacral war that is **most difficult to accept**. The **difference between the hostage and the viewer** **should be obvious** even to one who affects to disbelieve in his own existence; the viewer can **simply turn off the television** and thus **escape** his or her predicament. **Nor do the viewers have significant “exchange value,”** unless the governments concerned would discontinue the charade of war if they thought no one was watching, or unless the simulacrum exists only to the degree it is perceived. Thus the claim that “[t]he complement of the unconditional simulacrum in the field is to train everyone in the unconditional reception of broadcast simulacra” makes sense **only if one also accepts** that the simulacrum experienced by the viewer is identical to that experienced by the viewed. Those who believe in the reality of human suffering are likely to react to this idea with a certain amount of hostility, however. This reaction can only be exacerbated by the assertion that “it is [the hostages’] virtual death that is at issue, not their real death.

#### Baudrillard is just old and coping, while being nostalgic about the past, rambling to his grandchildren “back in my day blah blah blah” but doesn’t propose to do anything because he knows he can’t. Dhamee no date (Yousuf Dhamee, a rhizome, Publication date: Lost Futures, A Critique of Baudrillard, Cyber Space Hyper Test and Critical Theory, <https://cyberartsweb.org/cpace/theory/ydbaud.html>)

In The Precession of Simulacra Jean Baudrillard attempts to disentangle the phenomenon that the Post-Structuralist movement simultaneously identified, decried and helped popularize: the disappearance of the real. In examining the cultural climate of the West following 1970 Baudrillard finds a world where representation through a surplus of images has obscured all former notions of truth. The annihilation of the real has become a manifestation of Marx's nightmare of the commodity fetish. He portrays the United States, in particular, as a grim militaristic state controlled by the media's manipulation of images. Baudrillard finds himself disempowered by the endlessly proliferating images which confound the real. **His position becomes that of the male hysteric** , due in part to the fact that intellect and reason cannot make sense of the post-modern "world of hallucinations" where image, reality, and surface representation blur into each other. **Baudrillard in a sense writes himself out of his own text. In a world without truth the theorist/the semiotician/the intellectual (indeed the university itself) becomes irrelevant, if not totally impotent.** The idea of the loss of meaning is inherent in the concept of the simulacrum . Here the idea of an accurate copy becomes to a certain extent passé. Baudrillard states that we are removed from the binary which sets up copy and original; there are only copies of copies. In fact he takes the notion farther: the simulacra exists as a copy which has no original. According to Baudrillard the "imitation" can, in fact, precede the original. This results in a world without depth, a place where reality is only an endless interplay of surfaces. Simulations are produced in order to hide the fact that there is no original, no real. Baudrillard's intent is not to expose the falseness of the simulated real, but to lament the passing of the actual real. He seems to find the depthless world of images oppressive. He writes of the "murderous power of images," "the mirror of madness, and "the blackmail of the truth." His emotionally charged prose reflects a hysteria that derives from powerlessness. The loss of reference points, which results from the death of originality, contributes to the confusion that marks the modern world. As Baudrillard points out, the charm of a simulation lies in being able to distinguish copy from original. "Because it is difference that constitutes the poetry of the map and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the charm of the real." The loss of distinction between the two leads to the loss of truth. **Baudrillard, who holds a romanticized view of the real, seems nostalgic for a time when meaning existed.** "By crossing into a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor that of truth, the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials." **This statement appears problematic because he never can quite prove that meaning has ever existed and therefore appears to rewrite history in order to make others believe in depth**. For example, in his discussion of the Iconoclasts he assumes that the smashers of images were working under his own set of cultural assumptions. "If they could have believed that these images only obfuscated or masked the Platonic Idea of God, there would have been no reason to destroy them . . . But their metaphysical despair came from the idea that the image didn't conceal anything at all , and that these images were in essence not images, but perfect simulacra . . . " **Baudrillard, like a flawed Freudian, can be seen projecting his own beliefs onto the people he studies**. **By refusing to allow the Iconoclasts their own truth, he falls victim to the same cultural prejudices he decries in others**. At this point Baudrillard resembles the ethnologists he so roundly criticizes. Even if truth's existence is taken for granted (in a bygone era) Baudrillard does not conclusively show how meaning could be empowering. **Part of his problem with the simulacra stems from an intellectual background heavily steeped in Marxism. Marxists place a great deal of importance on the process of production. Simulation can be seen as stripping production of its meaning.** When production becomes unreal its ultimate object, "the product" is stripped of value. **This reality would in turn strip Marxism of its relevance, a fundamental problem for many Post-Structuralists, who like Baudrillard have important ties with the Left.** What exactly does it mean to be a Post-Structuralist and a Marxist? **The liquidation of truth makes political resistance seem somewhat futile**. **Baudrillard, significantly fails to offer a means of fighting the collapse of reason, and in his writings the theorist is relegated to the role of commentator**: Baudrillard is only able to announce that the apocalypse has begun.

#### Baudrillard more wrong than he is right and lacks empirical validity

Rojek and Turner 93(Chris Rojek is a Professor of Sociology at City University. He has held Professorships since 1994 at The University of Staffordshire; Nottingham Trent University and Brunel University, West London. He is the author of 14 solo authored books, 12 edited and co-edited books and over 50 refereed articles.

and Brian S. Turner is a British and Australian sociologist., 1992, Forget Baudrillard?, Introduction, https://monoskop.org/images/0/0a/Rojek\_Chris\_Turner\_Bryan\_Forget\_Baudrillard\_1993.pdf)

Should we the regret the dazzling ascent of this writer in the Anglo-American world over the last decade? Certainly if the quality of a writer in the social sciences is to be assessed only by the validity of his or her propositions there is reason for regretting Baudrillard’s success. **Baudrillard has been wrong—spectacularly wrong—about a lot of things.** One thinks of his prediction of the **impossibility of the Gulf war**; his assertion that **America is already utopia; his reactionary thesis** that the strength of the **feminine is seduction**; his eccentric defence of the concert against quadrophonic sound which is predicated in the argument that **Mozart was never intended to be heard through electronic systems of reproduction; and his unsupported statement that the body has become a mere extension of network television**. And one thinks of these things casually, without systematically sifting through the careening waves of Baudrillard’s prose for other hostages to fortune or bad prophecies. **In short, Baudrillard fails the validity test**. However, it is by no means clear that validity is the only or even the most important criterion to assess the significance of an author’s work. Other criteria such as courage and sympathy are also relevant. In these respects Baudrillard is on stronger ground. The success of his publications in the English-speaking world since the 1980s suggests that his main themes of simulation and the seductiveness of consumer culture have found sympathy with a large audience of readers. **Baudrillard may be wrong more often than he is right,** but he has unquestionably struck the appropriate mood with which to approach questions of consumer culture.

#### Hyperreality is itself postmodern, and fails to offer a critical understanding of culture other than explaining the obvious. Reality and meaning exists equally as it did in the past, the only thing that changed is the medium of exchange.

King 98(Anthony King, Department of Sociology at the University of Exeter, 1998, Philosophy and Social Criticism vol 24 no. 6, A critique of Baudrillard’s Hyperreality: towards a sociology of Postmodernism, pg 47-53, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/019145379802400603)

This article criticizes the concept of hyperreality which is central to Baudrillard’s later writings and, in doing so, intends to make a wider contribution to debates about postmodernism. In particular, I want to argue that Baudrillard’s hyperreality is an example of postmodern sociology, rather than a sociology of postmodernism. **By that, I mean that the notion of hyperreality is not, in the end, a critical concept providing a means by which sociologists might analyse contemporary cultural change; rather, the notion of hyperreality is itself postmodern,** 48 demonstrating those very features of nihilism, fragmentation and doubt, ’ which it highlights as central to recent social transformations. The examination of the concept of hyperreality is intended to show that such ’postmodern sociologies’ are limited and that they can be encompassed (and dialectically superseded) by a sociology of postmodernism. The critique of hyperreality (A) The sociological inadequacy of hyperreality Baudrillard is undoubtedly correct to point to the importance of the television as a central element in contemporary culture. It is a startling development that in the last 30 years practically every individual in capitalist countries is able to witness footage of events from almost anywhere around the globe. It is also true that this footage is invariably misleading, even though it is apparently so compelling and ’realistic’. Television is only tangentially connected with the realities it seeks to portray as well as contrasting dramatically with the social experience of the viewers; **we 52 witness riots, wars and massacres as they occur from the comfort of our living-rooms. However, from these admittedly curious features, Baudrillard leaps suddenly and unjustifiably to the claim that there is no longer any reality.** The television screen creates a ’false’ reality and it is in that reality that we now live. However, the television does not create a false reality either in its representation of the world or in its reception by viewers. Television coverage is determined by the cultural norms of the society to which it broadcasts and by those involved in the production of television. **Thus any footage is an interpretation of the world and as such it is necessarily limited.** It is certainly true that programme makers try to render this interpretation of the world as compelling as possible to attract viewers and to sustain their claims but **those images are always and necessarily embedded in social discourse, which is itself related to the historic development of the society. The images are not then free-floating, mere simulacra but, on the contrary, concrete moves in a language game.** They refer not so much to the reality of the situations they portray but rather to the society to which they communicate these images. **Similarly the viewers of television programmes do not regard these images as empty**, referenceless and fragmentary. On the contrary, just as the creation of these images was embedded in the interpretative practice of making sense of the world so do the viewers try to interpret these images in such a way that they will be able to make sense of their world. Whether the programme be a soap opera or news footage, the viewers interpret the images according to their cultural understandings (see, for instance, Fiske and Hartley, 1984; Hall, 1980; Featherstone, 1988: 220-1, 1991: 5, 11), although those understandings are under constant revision in order to make sense of new information. **Thus rather than becoming the primary and prior cultural factor in contemporary society, the television is embedded in and dependent upon pre-existing and historically produced understandings and discourses**.5 Furthermore, the footage does not exist above and beyond the lives of viewers but, as the briefest autobiographical consideration will reveal, **the television is employed as a resource, where new interpretations derived from its footage are used in the renegotiation of social relations and understandings. Viewers discuss what they watch and make use of what they see to make sense of their own lives. The argument for the fundamentally interpretative nature of the television and, therefore, its fundamental unoriginality as a cultural form undercuts Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality at an empirical level. In short, the television just does not represent the ontological transformation of culture which he envisages. The production and consumption of the television operates in the same interpretative manner as the production and consumption of literature, theatre and, indeed, oral 53 story-telling.** All these methods of communication have to operate according to the same interpretative norms, typical of all human interaction, for the very reason that they are all primarily linguistic. Baudrillard’s failure to recognize the fundamentally interpretative nature of television suggests some deeper philosophical and, in particular, deeper epistemological shortcomings in his theories. The recognition of Baudrillard’s epistemological weakness brings us to the second, philo- sophical strand of the argument against the notion of hyperreality which will demonstrate that Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality is founded in an unsustainable Cartesianism.

#### Baudrillard’s theory is false, It misrepresents Simulacra and Simulation, It is a work of hypocrisy and The Matrix fails to represent his overall theoretical position.

Cussen, **James**. “Why Baudrillard Hated the Matrix.” Medium, The Living Philosophy, **30 Apr. 2022**, medium.com/the-living-philosophy/why-baudrillard-hated-the-matrix-6052010375cd. 🐸

“The Matrix is surely the kind of film about the matrix that the matrix would have been able to produce.” These were the infamous words that Jean Baudrillard used to break his silence on The Matrix movies in a 2004 interview with [Le Nouvel Observateur](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/). Baudrillard’s idea of simulation — which we explored in-depth [in a previous instalment](https://www.thelivingphilosophy.com/baudrillard-simulation/) — was the primary inspiration behind the Wachowski siblings’ movie series. His 1981 book *Simulacra and Simulation*was not merely [a prop in *The Matrix*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6R94keJcHk) but was the main inspiration for the movies and was required reading for the whole cast. After the release of the first movie the Wachowskis reached out to Baudrillard inviting him to work on the sequels but he turned down the offer and in this interview we learn why. As it turns out Baudrillard — the “high priest of postmodernism” — hated the movies. In this article we are going to look at the three reasons he gives for this disdain:1. It misrepresents *Simulacra and Simulation*, 2. It is a work of hypocrisy and 3. The Matrix fails to represent his overall theoretical position. And following that we are going to look at why Baudrillard is wrong. #1 The Misrepresentation of The Matrix In 2004, a year after the release of the third Matrix movie, Baudrillard finally broke his silence on the Wachowskis’ cinematic adaptation of his work. It was well known by now that his work was the main inspiration behind the movies but he had never spoken publicly about them until now. And he was not happy. His first criticism is the rather damning claim that the movies completely miss the point of his work and that it confuses the classical Platonic problem of illusion with the postmodern problem of simulation. The Problem of Illusion The classical formulations of the problem of illusion were given by Plato and Descartes. Plato’s version comes from his dialogue *The Republic* where we find his allegory of the cave in which the mass of humanity lives in an illusory state where they mistake the shadows cast by a fire on the cave wall for reality. The philosopher is the one who leaves the cave and emerges into the real light of the sun. A more condensed version of this classical problem is found in Descartes’ work *Meditations* *on First Philosophy*where in a line of investigation that culminates in his famous conclusion “I think there I am”, Descartes embarks on a quest for the foundations of knowledge. He begins to question how he knows whether what he is experiencing is real. It seems to be real, and yet, he writes: “How often my sleep at night has convinced me of all these familiar things — that I was here, wrapped in my gown, sitting by the fire — when in fact I was lying naked [under the bedclothes](https://books.google.gr/books?id=i7l6la9W5SUC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=How+often+my+sleep+at+night+has+convinced+me+of+all+these+familiar+things%E2%80%94that+I+was+here,+wrapped+in+my+gown,+sitting+by+the+fire%E2%80%94when+in+fact+I+was+lying+naked+under+the+bedclothes&source=bl&ots=7wzHqfc794&sig=ACfU3U0KIG7XawG-Ai4a1DszQ0eP7rYbjw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjEjN3eg5j3AhVrgf0HHToKBvcQ6AF6BAgCEAM#v=onepage&q=How%20often%20my%20sleep%20at%20night%20has%20convinced%20me%20of%20all%20these%20familiar%20things%E2%80%94that%20I%20was%20here%2C%20wrapped%20in%20my%20gown%2C%20sitting%20by%20the%20fire%E2%80%94when%20in%20fact%20I%20was%20lying%20naked%20under%20the%20bedclothes&f=false).” This is the classical problem of illusion. For Descartes this sitting here beside the fire is reality while dreaming is an illusion. With the problem of illusion there is a clear and absolute distinction between reality and illusion. We see this problem being directly referenced by Morpheus in the first movie: Morpheus: “Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How would you know the difference between the dream world [and the real world](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-n0hKTizFwY)?” The Simulation Hypothesis Baudrillard’s simulation hypothesis is a tough idea to fully grasp. For a deeper exploration check out [the previous instalment](https://www.thelivingphilosophy.com/baudrillard-simulation/) where you can read my futile attempts to wrap my brain around the nuances of Baudrillard’s brilliant simulation hypothesis. The bottom line is that with the emergence of simulation in the [postmodern age](https://www.thelivingphilosophy.com/modernism-vs-postmodernism/) we have entered, this distinction between the real and the illusory, to use Baudrillard’s term, ‘implodes’. The difference between reality and illusion becomes meaningless. With the emergence of the age of simulation, the real has become inaccessible. We can no longer speak of the real, it is no longer attainable. We only have a simulated reality that Baudrillard calls the ‘hyperreal’ in which reality and illusion have imploded into each other. In *Simulacra and Simulation* he writes: “The impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real is of the same order as the impossibility of staging illusion. Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is [no longer possible](https://books.google.gr/books?id=9Z9biHaoLZIC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=The+impossibility+of+rediscovering+an+absolute+level+of+the+real+is+of+the+same+order+as+the+impossibility+of+staging+illusion.+Illusion+is+no+longer+possible,+because+the+real+is+no+longer+possible&source=bl&ots=3OU493cusY&sig=ACfU3U2RBXYssQ4uCKLqNkoEgrxXXEdTUg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwic45bHhJj3AhXA_rsIHS-zDk4Q6AF6BAgSEAM#v=onepage&q=The%20impossibility%20of%20rediscovering%20an%20absolute%20level%20of%20the%20real%20is%20of%20the%20same%20order%20as%20the%20impossibility%20of%20staging%20illusion.%20Illusion%20is%20no%20longer%20possible%2C%20because%20the%20real%20is%20no%20longer%20possible&f=false).” It is this distinction between the problems of simulation and illusion that Baudrillard, in the 2004 interview, claims the Matrix movies missed entirely. The problem as he sees it is that the distinction between what is real and what is illusion is far too clear cut. There’s a red pill that takes you to the truth and there’s a blue pill that leaves you in illusion. In the interview he states that: “The actors are in the matrix, that is, in the digitized system of things; or, they are radically outside it, such as in Zion, the city of resistors. But what would be interesting is to show what happens when these two worlds collide. The most embarrassing part of the film is that the new problem posed by simulation is confused with its [classical, Platonic treatment](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=The%20actors%20are,classical%2C%20Platonic%20treatment).” So for Baudrillard the Matrix movies have completely missed the point — they have the real in Zion and the illusion in the Matrix. The idea of the real is preserved. Of course any serious fan of the Matrix movies will be shouting at their screen right now saying that it is Baudrillard that has missed the point but we’ll come back to that in a minute. For now though we can say that Baudrillard’s first and his primary criticism of the movies is that they have missed the point of *Simulacra and Simulation*. They have misunderstood the idea of simulation and have set up an all-too-clear distinction between the real and the illusory. #2 The Matrix would love The Matrix Baudrillard’s second criticism of the Matrix series is what he sees as the hypocrisy of the movies. *The Matrix* is, on the surface of things, a criticism of technology and how technology is gaining more and more power over our lives. We learn that the humans in the real world had gone to war with their machines: Morpheus : We don’t know who struck first, us or them. But we do know it was us that scorched the sky. At the time, they were dependent on solar power. It was believed they would be unable to survive without an energy source as [abundant as the sun](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5b0ZxUWNf0&t=141s&ab_channel=FlashbackFM). However the machines find another power source — humans and so humanity become batteries that power the machine-run world. The entire setup and story of the Matrix is as a cautionary tale about the danger of technology and it is supposed to point us back to what really matters — our humanity, our freedom, our human love and connection. But Baudrillard remarks that “*The Matrix* is surely the kind of film about the matrix that the matrix would have been able to produce.” The interviewer picks up on this observation noting that it is: “a film that purports to denounce technicist alienation and, at the same time, plays entirely on the fascination exercised by the digital universe and [computer-generated images](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=It%20is%20also%20a%20film%20that%20purports%20to%20denounce%20technicist%20alienation%20and%2C%20at%20the%20same%20time%2C%20plays%20entirely%20on%20the%20fascination%20exercised%20by%20the%20digital%20universe%20and%20computer%2Dgenerated%20images).” Baudrillard expands on his point further saying that *The Matrix* movie is: “an instructive symptom, and the actual fetish of this universe of technologies of the screen in which there is no longer a distinction between the real [and the imaginary](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=an%20instructive%20symptom%2C%20and%20the%20actual%20fetish%20of%20this%20universe%20of%20technologies%20of%20the%20screen%20in%20which%20there%20is%20no%20longer%20a%20distinction%20between%20the%20real%20and%20the%20imaginary.). […] The Matrix paints the picture of a monopolistic superpower, like we see today, and then collaborates in its refraction. Basically, its dissemination on a world scale is complicit [with the film itself](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=The%20Matrix%20paints%20the%20picture%20of%20a%20monopolistic%20superpower%2C%20like%20we%20see%20today%2C%20and%20then%20collaborates%20in%20its%20refraction.%20Basically%2C%20its%20dissemination%20on%20a%20world%20scale%20is%20complicit%20with%20the%20film%20itself.).” And when you think about it Baudrillard has a solid point here. *The Matrix,* for all its criticism of technology, utilises it to make a spectacle. The very thing that is so seductive about the Matrix movies is the dazzling technological spectacle — there’s Neo dodging bullets, learning kung-fu by downloading a computer program, there’s the gunfights running up walls, there’s the world of the robots and the sentinels, and then of course, there’s the Matrix itself — the movie is a monolithic fetishization of the exact thing it sets out to criticise. For Baudrillard this is part of the broader cultural landscape that is so overwhelming. He says that this: “is exactly what makes our times so oppressive. The system produces a negativity in trompe-l’oeil, [a trick of the eye] which is integrated into products of the spectacle just as obsolescence is built into industrial products. It is the most efficient way of incorporating all genuine alternatives. There are no longer external Omega points or any antagonistic means available in order to analyze the world; there is nothing more than [a fascinated adhesion](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=That%20is%20exactly,a%20fascinated%20adhesion.).” And so in our postmodern world there is no solid ground from which to criticise the system. Che Guevara has been legitimised as an icon of rebellious adolescents and sells millions of t-shirts and posters every year. Critiques of the system on social media only further enshrine the power of those technological monopolies. Resistance is futile. The system is all-engulfing. #3 A Glimmer of Irony In his third criticism, Baudrillard moves from criticising *The Matrix* for misunderstanding the idea of simulation, to criticising the movies for failing to understand his philosophy in general. He says that: “The pseudo-Freud who speaks at the film’s conclusion puts it well: at a certain moment, we reprogrammed the matrix in order to integrate anomalies into the equation. And you the resistors, comprise a part of it. Thus we are, it seems, within a total virtual circuit [without an exterior](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=The%20pseudo%2DFreud%20who%20speaks%20at%20the%20film%E2%80%99s%20conclusion%20puts%20it%20well%3A%20at%20a%20certain%20moment%2C%20we%20reprogrammed%20the%20matrix%20in%20order%20to%20integrate%20anomalies%20into%20the%20equation.%20And%20you%2C%20the%20resistors%2C%20comprise%20a%20part%20of%20it.%20Thus%20we%20are%2C%20it%20seems%2C%20within%20a%20total%20virtual%20circuit%20without%20an%20exterior.).” Baudrillard is of course referring to the scene with the Architect at the end of the second movie *The Matrix Reloaded* [where the Architect explains](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHZl2naX1Xk) that the resistors in Zion are a part of the overall Matrix program. By giving rebellious outliers the illusion of autonomy and an escape into reality, they ensure the greater overall stability of the Matrix. But Baudrillard isn’t happy. His criticism is that the movies fail to enact his chosen form of rebellion which he summarises in the interview as: “a glimmer of irony that would allow viewers to turn this gigantic special effect [on its head](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=a%20glimmer%20of%20irony%20that%20would%20allow%20viewers%20to%20turn%20this%20gigantic%20special%20effect%20on%20its%20head.).” This ties in with Baudrillard’s broader philosophy of what he calls [Seduction](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Gc6jVNujvE) and his way of subverting this all-encompassing system within which we live. But when it comes to the Matrix, this criticism doesn’t make sense. The Wachowskis are being criticised for not being true to Baudrillard’s overall philosophy. He admits that they have created an all-encompassing system of oppression as he maps out in his works but criticises the movies for not also including his own chosen form of rebellion. But it’s an unfair criticism. The Wachowskis don’t reference Baudrillard’s entire corpus in The Matrix. They didn’t get the cast to read all of the French postmodernist’s books. They were primarily concerned with the problem of simulation as presented in the book *Simulacra and Simulation*. This third criticism then is to my eyes an unfair one because it criticises the movie for something it didn’t try to do. Baudrillard can dislike the film because it doesn’t agree with his philosophy but on this count he can’t knock the Matrix movies just because they aren’t exactly how he would have liked them to be. Why Baudrillard is Wrong. This brings us back to Baudrillard’s main criticism of *The Matrix* — it fails to portray the difference between simulation and reality — it makes the distinction too clear cut. This criticism might be applied to the first Matrix movie but remember this interview took place a year after the third movie had been released. Also Baudrillard referenced the conversation with the Architect at the end of the second movie in the interview so we know he has the second movie and so we can safely assume that he has also seen the third. And assuming that’s the case, Baudrillard has somehow dramatically missed the point because anyone who has seen the third movie or even just the end of the second movie would find it difficult to support Baudrillard’s critique. The third movie, *The Matrix Revolutions*, completes the fractalizing of epistemological doubts that had begun in the first movie. In the original movie we find out that the entire reality Neo is living in is a virtual reality universe. Neo escapes this Matrix and meets the other rebels who live in Zion — the underground city of humans in 2199. The second movie muddies the waters even more when we learn that even this rebel colony is part of the system. The Architect informs us that previous iterations of the Matrix had failed to account for the rebellious minority and so this rebellious anomaly had been incorporated into the design of this Matrix. The upshot is that yes Zion is the real world but the rebellion that Zion represents is not real. It is a simulated rebellion that serves the purpose of stabilising the Matrix. So already with the second movie we have the destabilisation of the neat dichotomy between reality and illusion. Already we have entered a blurred state of reality where even though Zion occurs in the real world it is a hyperreality — it is not a spontaneous utterance of nature but a crafted and predicted simulation of rebellion despite what its members may believe. This destabilisation of the reality principle reaches a new level at the end of the second movie which is picked up in the third as well. At the end of the second movie we see Neo destroying the sentinel robots — fighting them in the real world using the same sort of superpowers that we see him using inside the Matrix. Then, in the third movie we see his ability to see code when he goes blind and we also have the strange moment when a sentinel flies *through* him.These instances muddy the waters of reality more. We are now left questioning what is Matrix and what is reality and it seems that we can no longer truly tell one from the other.The “real” world of Zion and Machine City seems to be equally prey to the peculiar powers of Neo as the world of the Matrix. By the end of the series we can no longer say for certain what is real. Neo sues for peace with the machines but he does not know for sure what is reality. I’ve seen some people online argue that from the moment Neo leaves the room of the Architect he is in a new level of virtual reality. Others have argued that Zion was always a simulation. The bottom line is, the distinction between the real and the illusory has been muddied so much that we no longer know where one ends and the other begins. The distinction, has as Baudrillard would say, imploded.Final Thoughts In their introduction to the 2004 box set The Ultimate Matrix Collection, the Wachowski siblings say that“It was our sincerest hope that our movies might inspire or perhaps provoke a little Socratic interaction, something beyond, ‘Remember that one part? [That was cool’](https://books.google.gr/books?id=7mW5DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT23&lpg=PT23&dq=It+was+our+sincerest+hope+that+our+movies+might+inspire+or+perhaps+provoke+a+little+Socratic+interaction,+something+beyond,+%E2%80%98Remember+that+one+part?+That+was+cool%E2%80%99&source=bl&ots=AgiyjxGVU8&sig=ACfU3U0f-rtQsfVJzLewSFPVkteCi6Nj9w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiC2-XoiJj3AhWFOewKHRYaCrYQ6AF6BAgCEAM#v=onepage&q=It%20was%20our%20sincerest%20hope%20that%20our%20movies%20might%20inspire%20or%20perhaps%20provoke%20a%20little%20Socratic%20interaction%2C%20something%20beyond%2C%20%E2%80%98Remember%20that%20one%20part%3F%20That%20was%20cool%E2%80%99&f=false)”.There can be no doubt of their success. The Matrix movies are far from perfect and Baudrillard’s second criticism still stands. But that being said, I can’t think of any other movie except for maybe Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey* that has inspired so much philosophical engagement — hundreds of articles that transcend the [Analytic/Continental divide in philosophy](https://www.thelivingphilosophy.com/analytic-vs-continental-philosophy/).The Wachowski siblings created a work of art that has sparked a philosophical conversation in a way that no other movie ever has. It is easy to get distracted by the criticisms of the Matrix movies, and to miss the greater success of the movies as attaining their initial goal. The Wachowskis set out to make a movie that got people thinking and they succeeded at a scale that outstripped all expectations.

#### Baudrillard’s defenders are mere propagandists that reduce their own scholarship to accumulation.

Horrocks 95(Christopher Horrocks, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Design at Kingston University, August 16th 1995, Baudrillard and the Millennium[Postmodern Encounters], Beyond the Millennium: Anti-Baudrillard, the Vital Illusion and the Return of the Mirror People, pf 78-80)

Beyond the Millennium: AntiBaudrillard, the Vital Illusion and the Return of the Mirror People It is beside the point to condemn Jean Baudrillard for either spurning the tasks of rational and ethical judgement set by philosophers, or for his 'failure' to account for real human injustice, misery and oppression. Christopher Norris, Douglas Kellner, Alex Callinicos and a host of other writers in the Kantian or Marxist tradition have taken 58 Baudrillard to task, accusing his 'trash-theory' of being part of a modernist sensibility that substitutes art for philosophy, value for truth, image for reality, or Baudelaire for Kant."? Yet people do support Baudrillard's right to comment on our condition. For example, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has attacked those rationalist **critics of Baudrillard who assume that criticism only carries weight if one's feet are set on the rock of absolute and universal truth. These critics are always the last to claim that their stance is part of historical, social and mundane transformations. 7**8 As Chris Rojek notes, Baudrillard's tone and style is hardly one of indifference or happy consumerism. **Rather, Baudrillard writes like 'a man who is strapped to the mast of the pathological society, who sees everything without illusions and who accepts that there is no cure around the corner';"** In fact, Baudrillard himself puts forward his critics' standard complaints. These apostles of reality and truth, he says, **claim that he is monstrous for discrediting reality while there are so many in the world who find even existence difficult; that he fails to attack affluence on behalf of the poor; that he disparages class struggle when there are those who have not had their revolution; or that he insults feminism and human rights when many have not yet acquired those rights.** Baudrillard sees, **however, that these good intentions disguise a contempt.** In phrasing reality as a version of life insurance or a human right and, worse**, assuming that people place hope only in the visible proofs of their existence** ('a plaster-saint realism'), such critics take them for naive and feeble-minded. This contempt simply **reflects the desire of the propagandists of reality to reduce their own lives to an accumulation of facts, evidence, causes and effects.** 'Well-ordered resentment always begins at home', Baudrillard concludes. 80

#### Baudrillard’s theory is wrong, it results in a world without depth, and a place where reality is only an endless interplay of surfaces. Simulations are produced in order to hide the fact that there is no original, no real.

Yousuf **Dhamee NO DATE**

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In The Precession of Simulacra Jean Baudrillard attempts to disentangle the phenomenon that the Post-Structuralist movement simultaneously identified, decried and helped popularize: the disappearance of the real. In examining the cultural climate of the West following 1970 **Baudrillard finds a world where representation through a surplus of images has obscured all former notions of truth.** The annihilation of the real has become a manifestation of Marx's nightmare of the commodity fetish. He portrays the United States, in particular, as a grim militaristic state controlled by the media's manipulation of images. Baudrillard finds himself disempowered by the endlessly proliferating images which confound the real. **His position becomes that of the male hysteric** , due in part to the fact that intellect and reason cannot make sense of the post-modern "world of hallucinations" where image, reality, and surface representation blur into each other. **Baudrillard in a sense writes himself out of his own text.** In a world without truth the theorist/the semiotician/the intellectual (indeed the university itself) becomes irrelevant, if not totally impotent.

T**he idea of the loss of meaning is inherent in the concept of the simulacrum .** Here the idea of an accurate copy becomes to a certain extent passé**. Baudrillard states that we are removed from the binary which sets up copy and original; there are only copies of copies**. In fact he takes the notion farther: **the simulacra exists as a copy which has no original**. According to Baudrillard the "imitation" can, in fact, precede the original. **This results in a world without depth, a place where reality is only an endless interplay of surfaces.** Simulations are produced in order to hide the fact that there is no original, no real**.** Baudrillard's intent is not to expose the falseness of the simulated real, but to lament the passing of the actual real. He seems to find the depthless world of images oppressive. He writes of the "murderous power of images," "the mirror of madness, and "the blackmail of the truth." His emotionally charged prose reflects a hysteria that derives from powerlessness. The loss of reference points, which results from the death of originality, contributes to the confusion that marks the modern world. As Baudrillard points out, the charm of a simulation lies in being able to distinguish copy from original. "Because it is difference that constitutes the poetry of the map and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the charm of the real." The loss of distinction between the two leads to the loss of truth.

**Baudrillard, who holds a romanticized view of the real,** seems nostalgic for a time when meaning existed. "By crossing into a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor that of truth, the era of simulation is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials." This statement appears problematic because he never can quite prove that meaning has ever existed and therefore appears to rewrite history in order to make others believe in depth. For example, in his discussion of the Iconoclasts he assumes that the smashers of images were working under his own set of cultural assumptions. "If they could have believed that these images only obfuscated or masked the Platonic Idea of God, there would have been no reason to destroy them . . . But their metaphysical despair came from the idea that the image didn't conceal anything at all , and that these images were in essence not images, but perfect simulacra . . . " Baudrillard, like a flawed Freudian, can be seen projecting his own beliefs onto the people he studies. By refusing to allow the Iconoclasts their own truth, he falls victim to the same cultural prejudices he decries in others. **At this point Baudrillard resembles the ethnologists he so roundly criticizes.**

Even if truth's existence is taken for granted (in a bygone era) Baudrillard does not conclusively show how meaning could be empowering. **Part of his problem with the simulacra stems from an intellectual background heavily steeped in Marxism**. Marxists place a great deal of importance on the process of production. Simulation can be seen as stripping production of its meaning. When production becomes unreal its ultimate object, "the product" is stripped of value. **This reality would in turn strip Marxism of its relevance, a fundamental problem for many Post-Structuralists, who like Baudrillard have important ties with the Left**. What exactly does it mean to be a Post-Structuralist and a Marxist? The liquidation of truth makes political resistance seem somewhat futille. Baudrillard, significantly fails to offer a means of fighting the collapse of reason, and in his writings the theorist is relegated to the role of commentator: Baudrillard is only able to announce that the apocalypse has begun

## Alt Fails/Solvency Turns

#### Baudrillard’s alternatives are ambiguous and overly conflated, and puts “liberation” at a huge cost.

Robinson 13(Andy Robinson, is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. He is the co-author (with Athina Karatzogianni) of Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (Routledge, 2009). He has recently published a series of books on Homi Bhabha, February 7th 2013, Jean Baudrillard and Activism: a critique, Cease Fire, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/)

Baudrillard’s critique of Marx is interesting, and I think largely valid. What he puts in place of Marx’s theory is, however, contentious. His recent work gives the impression of a disillusioned Situationist seeking to find an alternative to revolution in a world where none is apparent. As a result, he finds ways to read conformist mass practices as unconscious resistances, irrational systemic functioning and implosion, and so on. **Baudrillard is also too prone to conflate system collapse with liberation.** There are scenarios of implosion which would not lead to liberation. **One might, for instance, think of climate change due to overconsumption as a scenario of system-collapse. This would bring about the end of the code, but also possibly the end of humanity.** In some ways, the idea of implosion echoes Sing Chew’s theory of world-system collapse. Based on previous episodes of collapse, Chew argues that the world-system will collapse when it reaches its ecological limits. It won’t explode; it will collapse inwards and break down as the processes which sustain it are reversed. Each ‘civilisation’ is followed by a ‘dark age’. Populations move outwards from cities, power is diffused, and local knowledge replaces global knowledge. This is not quite what Baudrillard has in mind, but similar enough to be suggested as an effect of continued implosion. Or maybe implosion should be compared to the ‘extraordinary communities’ of disaster, to the sudden collapse of the system’s management structures after which people take over their own self-management (as in Argentina), to the fraying round the edges of a system which can no longer secure the code at its more remote limits (as in Africa). **Perhaps as the code burns itself up, we will be left occupying wastelands where we are finally free, but at great cost. Hence, an implosive collapse of the system might give rise to a hope for other social forms.** It might, after all, be liberation in disguise. What of the crucial concept of ‘symbolic exchange’? Baudrillard’s discussion of symbolic exchange oscillates between three poles. Firstly, it refers to the experience of living in an embedded society, with rituals, exchanges and local knowledges. Secondly, it refers to the crisis-effects of the decomposition of the code, which create symbolic exchange as their effect. Thirdly, it refers to a kind of experience beyond the regime of simulation, through arbitrary connections. **The political effects of the process Baudrillard advocates is thus rather ambiguous.** Does the rise of symbolic exchange herald a return to embedded forms of social relations, to some kind of modern band or tribe which reproduces aspects of embedded forms, or something else entirely? The recovery of immediacy, connectedness, uncoded relations, ‘exchange’ between signs and the world, are important aspects of disalienation. However, I have issues with the Lacanian view of the subject which underpins Baudrillard’s theory of symbolic exchange. **It is possible to endorse Baudrillard’s view of the death of value in capitalism and the creation of a self-reproducing code, without necessarily seeing the alternative in terms of symbolic exchange and death.** A wide variety of other theories are attempting the same thing – from ‘anti-civilisation’ theories to Agamben’s ‘whatever-singularity’. **It might be more useful to hitch Baudrillard’s critique to a more affirmative theory, than to attempt to follow his ‘fatal’ strategies.**

#### Baudrillard theory of is extremely hostile towards minority struggles and over totalizes systems control.

Robinson 13(Andy Robinson, is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. He is the co-author (with Athina Karatzogianni) of Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (Routledge, 2009). He has recently published a series of books on Homi Bhabha, February 7th 2013, Jean Baudrillard and Activism: a critique, Cease Fire, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/>)

**There are serious limits to Baudrillard’s work, in terms of his hostility to ‘minority’ struggles. Many of his formulations are inadvertently sexist and racist. There are also times when Baudrillard comes across as ableist in his critiques of the therapeutic.** There are also times when Baudrillard attacks activism in strong terms: Hippies reproduce capitalist ideology**; Feminists displaying images of porn are actually being seductive, against their will**; The left is keeping capitalism alive with its moral critiques and its quests for meaning. **There are times when it is hard to tell if Baudrillard is a reactionary, attacking the concerns of progressives, or an ultra-left, criticising every rebellion as insufficiently extreme. One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise.** Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present**, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development**. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has not ended older modalities of brutality. At times, **Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’**. This may be because his works were **mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic**. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911. **Another problem is a lack of a Southern dimension. Like many Northern authors, Baudrillard’s approach mainly applies to the functioning of capitalism in the North.** The penetration of the code is substantially less in countries where information technology is less widespread. In parts of Africa, even simple coding exercises such as counting votes or recording censuses are extremely difficult. This is for the very reasons of respondent reflexivity which Baudrillard highlights. People will under-record themselves to stay invisible, or over-record themselves to obtain benefits. And without massive resources to put into its bureaucracies, the system is unable to find enough people who will act as transmitters for the code. Instead, people use their power to extract what they can from the system. Explosions still happen regularly in the South. Furthermore, a contracting system ‘forcibly delinks’ large portions of the globe. Its power on the margins is lessened as its power at the core is intensified. As the system becomes ever more contracted and inward-looking, liberated zones may appear around the edges. Without an element of border thinking, **Baudrillard tends to exaggerate the system’s completeness and effectiveness. Baudrillard assumes that any excess is everywhere absorbed into the code. He ignores the persistence of borderlands. And when he talks about the South, he admits that the old regime of production might still exist here: people still work seeking betterment; colonial wars are fought to destroy persisting symbolic exchange; Saddam was not playing the Gulf War by the rules of deterrence. The Arab masses are still able to become inflamed by war or non-war; Iran and Iraq can still fight a real war, not a simulated non-war. So perhaps only a minority, only the included layers within the North, are trapped within simulation and the ‘masses’. Perhaps reality has not died, but been displaced to the South.**

## AT: Specifics

### AT: Academy

**Research in academic spaces can generate policy-relevant information necessary to navigate cyberspace. A focus on state-policy can be combined with critical approaches BUT abandoning statism makes relevant research impossible.**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

A second approach focuses on why cyber norms emerge only slowly, building on the existing IR norms literature (Finnemore & Hollis, 2016). Early works in this area focused on the debate among states, especially at the United Nations, followed by a growing number of proposal from the private and the civil sector (Hurwitz, 2014). However, cyber norms remain contested at the international level (Grisby, 2017). More recently, the interest of researchers shifted to the role of the creators (mostly private entities) and exploiters (sub-, semi-, and non-state actors) of digital technologies in shaping the behavioral standards that new regulation needs to take into account (Hurel & Lobato, 2018). **States** need to know how their **intelligence services** work in cyberspace, because through their **tools** and **practices** they set practical norms of acceptable (**cyber) espionage** with far-reaching effects on **state behavior** in **cyberspace** (Georgieva, 2019). The focus on the role of **intelligence** agencies in cyber conflict–as both the biggest threat and the most **capable provider** of **safety**–opens up interesting questions linked to the **larger transformation** of these agencies in the context of the **digitization of society**. Some authors argue that cyber conflict is primarily an **intelligence game**, because setting up cyber exploitation is much more expensive than countering released exploitation, which increases the incentive to keep the target at risk (Lindsay, 2017).

A third approach explores the broader repercussion of cyber conflict dynamics for government and governance. The concept of networked governance seems especially apt at capturing the essence of cyberspace as co-constituted by technical devices and networks and socio-political institutions (Hofmann, 2016). The key governance challenge in cyberspace is fragmentation of authority and accountability. A case in point is the lack in public transparency and trusted knowledge about the perpetrators behind most cyber incidents. Although the number of public attributions of cyber incidents by states and threat intelligence firms has been on the rise, both types of actors have political and economic reasons not to fully disclose their evidence (Egloff, 2019). As a consequence, attribution claims remain contested in the public domain, undermining the legitimacy of state action–from insurance matters and criminal proceedings to mechanism of international cooperation and potentially escalation control.

Cluster 3: Securitization, practice, and assemblages

Looking back at the beginnings of the cyber threat story, the policy debate was riddled with cyber-doom scenarios and constant attempts to mobilize in the political process. As a reaction to what was considered a “hype,” some scholars started to get interested in why and how this issue was presented the way it was and with what consequences. Early work to analyze the issues surrounding the politics of Internet from IR and critical security studies perspectives emerged at the end of the 1990s (Deibert, 2002; Eriksson, 2001; Saco, 1999). A bit later, there was a concentrated effort to apply variations of securitization theory to the issue of cyber security politics (cf. Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2013). Securitization signifies the representation of a fact, a person, or a development as a danger for the military, political, economic, ecological, and/or social security of a political collective and the acceptance of this representation by the respective political addressee (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). The successful securitization of a topic justifies the use of all available means to counter it–including those outside the normal political rules of the game.

Following the theory, the prime questions this literature engaged with were related to the object of security, to what or whom was considered the main threat, and to what policy responses flowed from these threat constructions (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Given its theoretical underpinnings, the Copenhagen School focuses mainly on official statements by heads of state, high-ranking officials or heads of international institutions (Hansen, 2006, p. 64). What a focus on elite speech acts ignores, however, is how these discursive practices are facilitated or prepared by practices of actors that are not so easily visible. The social competition for the definition of reality is not only held in the open political arena. There are always state and nonstate actors “under the radar”–that is, specialized bureaucratic units, consultants or other experts–which have the capacity to establish “the truth” about certain threats, thus pre-structuring the discursive field in relevant ways (Huysmans, 2006, p. 72).

Cyber security, so the common assumption, arises from the interaction of technologies, processes, and everyday practices. Thus, the literature pays particular attention to how a variety of actors uses different representations of danger to create or change different political, private, social, and commercial understandings of security in selected public spheres. In addition, it gives more weight to material aspects of the issue in the tradition of STS (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016; Collier, 2018; Shires, 2018; Stevens, 2016), looking at the co-constitution of technology and politics. In particular, it recognizes that the political reading of cyber security cannot be divorced from particular knowledge practices in different communities.

As the most recent research focus to emerge, literature in this cluster covers a variety of topics, united by a focus on understanding how cyber security emerges as an assemblage of people, objects, and enacted ideas. Questions of authority and power are most directly addressed by research in this cluster. C. Stevens (2019) sets out to better understand the role of cyber security companies by looking at Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet and the publication of their reports in the public. Tanczer (2019) focuses on the increasingly blurred boundaries between field of security professionals and hackers, pointing to changes in the larger context of security and insecurity that are reflected in the practices of these technical experts and in the conception of them. Shires (2019) looks at how the cyber security industry portrays cyberspace as a terrain of persistent threat, systemic vulnerability, and intelligence ambiguity, a classic “noir” narrative that results from systemic economic deficiencies (distorted incentives for protection) and from systemic political deficiencies (black markets for new exploits). By focusing on non-traditional actors and aspects of politics, this type of research is able to make invisible aspects of cyber security visible.

Conclusion: Where is **cyber security** politics research headed?

Over the past decade, **research** in **cyber security** politics has seen the emergence of a **growing** interdisciplinary **body** of work that is at the same time **theoretically informed**, grounded in **empirical observations**, and **policy-relevant** in many of its insights. We have ended our **intellectual history** by outlining three research clusters. In place of a summary of the past and present evolution of cyber security as a security political issue, we want to look into a possible future of research on cyber security politics in this concluding section. We do this based on the same assumption discussed at the beginning of this article: that the trajectory of both cyber security research and cyber security policy will continue to be shaped by the interplay between technology, politics, and science. The direction in which research and policy will move will be co-constituted by technological possibilities, political choices, and scientific practices. We end our intellectual history with a brief outlook on likely developments in all three areas.

Digital technologies have politics, and technological possibilities and developments will require new governance mechanisms, while at the same time being shaped by politics. First, the interconnectedness between ever more complex socio-technical systems is bound to increase. Cyber security will grow in importance as a topic as countries all around the world strive to shape digital transformation processes that affect society, economy, and the state alike. In the context of what has been called fourth industrial revolution, the complexity of socio-technical systems will increase due the ubiquitous digitalization and automation of technical processes that support a great variety of socio-political institutions. As these technical system become tighter coupled and integrate more aspects of society and economy, cyber security concerns will inevitably expand to more policy fields at both the national and international level. These developments will create new demands for technical and organizational research that needs to be better integrated with approaches from the social and political science.

Second, cyberspace will become increasingly dependent on space-based technologies and interlinked with newly emerging technologies in the fields of quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This will increase the size of cyberspace. More importantly, as an enabling technology with diverse applications in all areas of life, AI will link cyberspace to more policy fields. AI will become an essential element of cyber security and will have a profound impact on the speed, scale, duration, autonomy, and complexity of cyber operations, for both offense and defense. These new technologies will be primarily developed by global technology firms and the private sector. As a consequence, state actors will likely become more dependent on technology firms and independent technology experts, further transforming the relationship between public and private actors. The fact that there is considerable **uncertainty** regarding the tempo and scope of these technological developments creates new demands for **research** that maps, assesses, models, and **forecasts** new **technological possibilities**. As social scientists, we need to understand the increasingly salient **political** and social **aspects** that will affect the patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** in politics and society at the national and international level.

**Political choices** at the **national** and international **level** have a **technological dimension**. Politics will **influence** and **govern technology** development while at the same time being **pre-structured** by **technology**. First, we can expect that **political** and military **actors** will attempt to better understand the (limited) **strategic utility** of cyber operations below the level of **armed conflict**, in order to find the right balance between **restraint** and **exploitation**. One key challenge in this context is ho**w best** to **manage** the **transformation** of state intelligence services in the digital age and their **growing dependence** on private intelligence firms. Another key challenge is linked to information operations and propaganda that might be spread more targeted and effectively via AI technologies and social media platforms. These political developments raise important research questions that require interdisciplinary answers.

Second, public actors will uphold their efforts to control the risk of escalation trough international cooperation. States cannot secure cyberspace on their own, without taking into account **market** and **social forces**; yet no **stable cyber governance** framework will emerge without greater **convergence** on **responsible behavior** among **great powers**. As long as great powers **disagree** about what represents responsible use of **cyber operations** in **state interactions**, and for that matter what forms of espionage and interference in the political process of other states through cyberspace are acceptable, **little** top-down **progress** will materialize. **Bottom-up progress**, on the other hand, presupposes that the actors become **more visible** for each other in order to **successfully work together** in a multi-stakeholder framework. **Research** can shed light on **invisible actors** and **analyze** the interaction between market **dynamics** and **political dynamics** in stabilizing cyberspace, it can evaluate if the socio-technical institutions that secure cyberspace reflect the tools and practices of public and private actors.

Third, the key governance challenge at the domestic political level is how to overcome fragmentation of authority and accountability. Tighter coupling of technical systems and their growing interconnectedness with socio-political institutions creates growing demand for governance in networks, which in turn means that governments increasingly share responsibility with actors from business and society. The integration of policy into a coherent overall framework involves difficult trade-offs between security and privacy and creates horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation problems across government and at the intersections between state, economy, and society. Research can evaluate how states can fine-tune their multidimensional roles. How states decide to regulate their technology base is moreover directly linked to how they anticipate this will influence their relative economic, political, and military power at the international level. Academics in this context can study how different (democratic and authoritarian) political systems balance regulation and market forces differently and what this means for state access to the private technology sector, export control systems of dual-use technologies, and screening mechanisms of foreign investment into the strategically relevant technology base.

Scientific practice, as our third and final sphere of interest, will keep coevolving with the anticipated changes in the spheres of technology and politics. We started the article with the ascertainment that there is no “field” or “subfield” of cyber security politics–and we conclude with a wish that this remains true in the future. Research at the **intersection** of **cybersecurity** and **security politics** in order to remain **relevant** to **policy choices** and cognizant of technological possibilities needs to **speak to** a variety of **other bodies of research**, free to choose interesting and pressing issue without **disciplinary constraints**; it needs to co-opt some of the **new data** analytical tools **offered by AI**, and it needs to flexibly overcome some of the **institutional barriers** that slowed down its **independent contribution** to **cyber security**.

A first key challenge for cyber security politics research is conceptual and linked to the integration of theoretical knowledge from different disciplines and research traditions. Researchers need to better integrate concepts and mechanisms from IR and security studies, IPE, and intelligence studies to analyze the transformation of intelligence services and how this affects their relationship with private cyber security and intelligence firms. They need to better understand the interplay between (black) security markets and (covert) security political dynamics if they want to explain the co-existence of strategic restraint and low-level subversion in cyberspace. Cyber security politics research must pay more attention to economic aspects of the phenomena at hand. Practice theory with its focus on technological possibilities and socio-technical processes allows to integrate these different approaches at the empirical level. STS offers a productive lens for understanding the mutual interplay between the technical and the socio-political sphere and, from an analytical point of view, to deal with the opaqueness of cyber operations. Such an approach is of critical importance in an attempt to shed light on how the cyber security policy and practice of states, both at the national and the international level, are facilitated or thwarted by the interests and practices of actors that are not easily visible, in- and outside of governments.

A second key challenge or indeed an opportunity for cyber security politics research is linked to the fact that more data about cyber operations by many different actors around the world and better tools to monitor and analyze this data are becoming available. While there is room for theory development and theory testing, we will likely enter an era of empirical work. In-depth qualitative studies on the role of invisible actors in state interactions linked to cyber security can be combined with more data-driven approaches that evaluate how new AI tools affect the cyber offense-defense balance. As state actors begin to integrate these tools in their border guards, police corps, armies and disaster response structures, important social and political questions will arise linked to privacy, bias, and control. Conversely, governments and societies will need to discuss how much of this new data should be made publicly available and what this means for data protection and privacy. From a research point of view, these developments call for more interdisciplinary research at the intersection of computer science, mathematics, economics, and political science.

A third key challenge for cyber security politics research is linked to overcoming the institutional barriers that slow down its independent contribution to cyber security and cyber security politics. Universities can help the public actors at the national and international level to catch up in their technology competence, while educating the next generation of experts for society and industry. **Academia** can contribute to the study of **cyber conflict** and through its **independent** and peer-reviewed **knowledge** broaden the knowledge base for some of the **difficult** policy choices discussed above. Science can collaborate with the **private** and **public actors** in the development of **evidentiary standards** and norms that will underpin the **future resilience** of sociotechnical systems, and in the negotiation and establishment of new norms and institutions that should govern the use and misuse of these systems. Yet in order to free its full **potential**, universities must overcome the **institutional barriers** that slow down **interdisciplinary** and more so **transdisciplinary research** intersection of science, technology, while building a network of institutions and programs that together can considerably expand the body of **public knowledge** surrounding these societally and politically relevant questions.

### AT: Charity Cannibalism

#### Images of suffering are key to compassion

Porter 6 (Prof & head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, (Elisabeth, Hypatia 21.4, project muse)

I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further the nature of attentiveness. If morality is about our concerned responsiveness, attention is the prerequisite to intense regard. Iris Murdoch borrowed the concepdt of "attention" from Simone Weil "to express the idea of a just and loving gaze" (1985, 34) on the reality of particular persons. Part of the moral task is, as Murdoch reiterated, to see the world in its reality—to see people struggling in pain and despair. Weil, too, gave "attention" a prominent place, grounded in concrete matters of exploitation, economic injustice, and oppression.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v021/21.4porter.html#FOOT23) Her emphases were pragmatic in struggling against the debilitating nature of life—how "it humiliates, crushes, politicizes, demoralizes, and generally destroys the human spirit" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 16)—and idealistic in striving to put ideals into practice. Too readily, we think about suffering in the height of media accounts of famine, suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, refugee camps, and war's destructive impact, and retreat quickly into our small world of self-pity. As Margaret Little explains, Murdoch's point was that "the seeing itself is a task—the task of being attentive to one's surroundings" (1995, 121). We need to "see" reality in order to imagine what it might be like for others, even when this includes horrific images from war violence.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v021/21.4porter.html#FOOT24) Yet despite the presence of embedded journalists, media reporting of such events as the invasion of Iraq has remained entirely typical in that "the experience of the people on the receiving end of this violence remains closed to us" (Manderson 2003, 4). Without political imagination, we will not have compassionate nations. "Without being tragic spectators, we will not have the insight required if we are to make life somewhat less tragic for those who . . . are hungry, and oppressed, and in pain" (Nussbaum 1996, 88). In order for political leaders to demonstrate [End Page 113] compassion, they should display the ability to imagine the lives led by members of the diverse groups that they themselves lead. Otherwise, dispassionate detachment predominates and acts like the 2003 invasion of Iraq lead to talk of freedom without seeing fear, assume liberation without replacing the losses, and abuse power without addressing people's pain. "The difference, for instance, between someone who discerns the painfulness of torture and someone who sees the *evil* of it is that the latter person has come to see the painfulness as a reason not to torture" (Little 1995, 126). Attentive ethics in international relations is about priorities and choices.

#### Multiple studies prove you’re wrong about people enjoying suffering and that images are necessary for action

Kyriakidou 21 (Maria, Senior Lecturer at the School of Journalism, Media and Culture, “The Audience of Human Communication”, 2021, ‘er’)

* makes a psycho claim that baudrillard debaters unconsciously distance themselves from suffering through these args. probably the funniest card i’ve ever cut.

Researching the audience of suffering Limited but growing empirical research on audience responses to mediated suffering has been predominantly inspired by the reception paradigm of audience studies, whereby media viewers and users are approached as actively constructing meaning and interpreting media messages through various degrees of involvement and positioning in relation to the media (Livingstone, 1998; Morley, 1980, 1992). Given their qualitative nature, these studies have been small-scale, in-depth explorations of viewers’ reactions to mediated suffering. They have employed a variety of methods, such as focus groups, interviews and diaries. They have predominantly studied how audiences relate to news stories of suffering (Höijer, 2004; Huiberts & Joye, 2017; Kyriakidou, 2011) and, less often, to suffering witnessed through non-news programmes (Ong, 2015b; Scott, 2014); very few studies have explicitly studied audience engagement with humanitarian campaigns (Seu, 2003; 2010; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). In her seminal work on the topic, Höijer explored audience reactions to the ‘discourse of global compassion’ constructed by the media through the reporting of humanitarian crises, wars and political conflicts and their innocent victims (Höijer, 2004). Her research, based on empirical material gathered through interviews and focus groups in Norway and Sweden, studied viewers’ reactions to media reports of war and violent news and concluded that compassion is most often directed to particular images of suffering and varies in its forms and expressions. Höijer concludes by describing the complexity of audience responses to suffering as ‘a twosided effect of global compassion on the one hand, and ignorance and compassion fatigue on the other’ expressed through ‘different forms of compassion as well as different forms of indifference’ (Höijer, 2004, p. 528). Indifference mostly reflected a critical stance and suspicion of media texts as either propagandistic or reflecting sensationalist, nationalistic mindsets, as well as overfamiliarity with images of suffering. Compassion, on the other hand, can be ‘tender-hearted’, ‘blamefilled’, ‘shame-filled’ and ‘powerlessness-filled’, according to Höijer. Interestingly, although the author acknowledges a variety of affective responses here, such as indignation or guilt, these are all described as being expressions of the same emotion, namely compassion. Focusing on the audience of humanitarian appeals, Seu also employed focus groups in a UK-based study of audience responses to NGO campaigns and news stories of human rights violations (Seu, 2003; 2010). Her analysis, focusing on the issue of audience (in)action and drawing upon the principles of psychology, psychoanalysis and rhetoric, illustrates the different ways people discursively distance themselves from the suffering of others and justify their unresponsiveness to human rights appeals. Scepticism about NGOs, their messages and international aid generally are given as reasons for such distancing. Cohen and Seu (2002, p. 189) describe such argumentative strategies as a ‘vocabulary of denial’ serving to avoid moral responsibility for witnessed suffering. Desensitisation, Seu argues, is a ‘defense’ mechanism against the realisation that ‘our social responsibility and human compassion, for whatever reason, do not stretch enough to getting us involved’ (Seu, 2003, p. 191). In a large-scale, UK-based study, Martin Scott (2014) combined focus group discussions with diaries, whereby participants were asked to log their daily media engagement. This research design allowed the author to move beyond the news genre and explore the mediation of distant suffering more broadly, including through other, factual television programmes. Influenced by Boltanski’s work, Scott analysed his material through the perspective of the options for action and emotion available to the viewers. He found substantial evidence of indifference to mediated encounters with distant suffering, particularly among young participants, as well as what he describes as ‘solitary enjoyment’, whereby research participants positioned themselves as observers of others’ suffering, devoid of any moral obligation to act (Scott, 2014, p. 13). An equally common type of engagement among participants was a tendency to evaluate media texts in terms of their accuracy and informational value (Scott, 2014, p. 10). Feelings of anger and indignation, per Boltanski’s topic of denunciation, were rather limited (Scott, 2014, p. 11). Given that participants seemed to be more emotionally involved with documentaries and current affairs programmes (Scott, 2014, p. 18), Scott’s study confirms Chouliaraki’s argument that media texts that represent suffering in its complexity and humanise the victims are necessary for constructing options for action and emotion on the part of the viewer (Chouliaraki, 2006).

### AT: Cyber Security = Simulation

**Cyber-security research is based in sound research. Cold war threat inflation is a thing of the past.**

Cavelty and Wegner 20 (Myriam Dunn and Andreas, PhDs from Zurich and lecturers, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855>)

Cluster 1: The **reality of cyber conflict**: Explaining state restraint and practices

In the **beginning** of this **intellectual history**, political aspects of **cyber security** were discussed almost **exclusively** in publications originating in U.S. **think tanks** and **war colleges** (for example: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1992). This literature had **little ambition** to contribute to an academic debate. The two main questions it tackled were “who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment” and “how to best counter the new and evolving threat.”

The first cluster is characterized by a **reevaluation** of the threat based on **empirical evidence** and a **gradual application** and adaption of “**old**” **IR** and strategic studies concepts to **cyber security** (Kello, 2013). Two cyber incidents–the discovery of **Stuxnet** in 2010 and later the **Snowden disclosures** in 2013–were **instrumental** in shifting the focus of both **policymakers** and **researchers** from the **threat politics** of “**what if**”-scenarios that had dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to the **reality** of the **strategic use** of **cyberspace** by state actors. In this new context, literature in **IR** and **strategic studies** could be used to examine how **state actors** use cyber instruments for their **political** or **military advantage** and analyze their impact on national and international security (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Kello, 2017; Maness & Valeriano, 2016). A strong disciplinary “**pull**” is visible in how early works **zoomed** in on an alleged **offensive advantage** in cyberspace due to the ubiquity of technical vulnerabilities (Peterson, 2013), grappled with the problem of **escalation dynamics** in cyberspace (Liff, 2012), and asked how deterrence might be adapted in order to uphold stability in cyberspace (Wilner, 2019).

As researchers began to build data sets of cyber operations (Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2014) to link cyber issues to the larger agenda of conflict studies, an empirical puzzle emerged that **challenged** many of the **theoretical tenets** and standards assumptions of the **older literature**. Most cyber operations did not seem escalatory, nor were they determined by power asymmetries or changed the existing strategic balance. **Overall**, states seemed to exercise a fair amount of **restraint** in cyberspace (Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). **At the same time, however**, a lot of cyber operations linked to **state rivalries occurred**, though as mere add-ons to existing conflict dynamics and not independent of a broad range of other foreign policy instruments (Betz & Stevens, 2011).

Reacting to this puzzle, the literature in this cluster has begun to move in two directions: First, and comparable to the evolution of the strategic studies literature during the nuclear age, some authors have started to integrate additional non-systemic explanatory factors into their analyses of cyber conflict. While some explore the role of beliefs and **cognitive biases** in cyber policy decision making (Gomez, 2019), others zoom in on the destabilizing role of bureaucratic politics and other deficiency of the policy process especially in crisis decision making. Second, and more consequentially, many authors acknowledge that the emerging empirical picture reflects the structural feature of cyberspace as an operating environment, which is marked by a high degree of technical interconnectedness and constant political contestation (Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018; Smeets, 2018). Taking this into account, operating strategically in cyberspace seems to be more technically and organizationally demanding than the “cheap and easy”-metaphor suggests, while at the same time offering little enduring strategic gains in the sense of changing a rival’s political goals (Lewis, 2018; Slayton, 2017)

### AT: Fiat = Simulation

#### Fiat is good, makes us more focused on social relations and less militarized especially in the context of NATO.

Shearer 21 (Allan, School of Architecture Associate Dean for Research and Technology, Roleplaying to Improve Resilience, https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10121445/1/AMPS-18-6.pdf , 2021, ‘er’) \*figure 2 omitted

Figure 2 presents a graphic comparison of the three assessments of critical uncertainties. Direct comparison is imperfect because each assessment was approached differently – again, in the first assessment, students worked in interdisciplinary groups, in the second, students worked alone while imagining the priorities of a fictional character, and in the third, students worked individually and from their own perspectives. While analytically messy, the results are a direct outcome of intentionally putting the students in positions where they had to think about the city from multiple perspectives. Nevertheless, observations can be made. It may be notable that in the first assessment (a group-based activity), the two PMESII factors that were used most commonly were Military and Infrastructure, both in terms of number of times cited and number of connections to different factors. The only relationship to receive more than one mention was Social-Infrastructure. The factors that were used least commonly were Political and Social. The initial identification of Military and Infrastructure factors might be expected given both that the base scenario was developed by NATO and that policy and planning programmes commonly emphasize infrastructure to support health, safety and welfare services. In the second (role-based) exercise, the results were reversed. Political and Social factors came to the forefront. Military and Infrastructure categories were still used, but not as dominantly. Also of note in the second assessment, all relationships are flagged by at least one person except the one between Economics and Information. In the third assessment, Infrastructure and Social are the most mentioned categories (19 and 12 respectively) and their connection is the most cited link pairwise. Perhaps curiously, in the third assessment, issues that relate to Information are not identified as of critical importance. This result suggests follow-up investigation given current conversations about ‘fake news’.46 Looking across the results it can be seen that between the first and third assessment more relationships are identified, and that can be recognized as supporting the primary goal of the exercise. Perhaps also, the connection to Political topics or concerns, which was prominent in the second assessment, was carried through into the third assessment. Referring to Table 1, the base political question is: ‘How is a member (typically a citizen) identified, what rights pertain to a member and how do those rights differ from non-members?’ As a set of exercises, participants were asked to play roles beyond their professional and sometimes educational experiences. Several of the students offered unsolicited comments that the experiment was unlike anything they had ever done in school or professional life. While each person was able to provide some level of analytical thinking (through the PMESII diagrams, maps and memo) that reflected the role s/he was asked to play, it must also be said that there were differing levels of comfort in trying to play these roles during the game. A sentiment expressed immediately following the exercise during a group discussion was that empathy may be the decisive criteria, but it will not be empathy with the person who delivers the news per se, but with the situation that is shared through real time Virtual Reality transmissions. The presentation of news would be replaced by experience (even if mediated experience) and without that experience, there would be no buy-in. David Chandler, who has written extensively on the role of resilience as a framing mechanism for governance in the Anthropocene, has commented, ‘For resilience-thinking, the type of knowledge that is possible is necessarily concrete rather than abstract; therefore, complexity- and resilience-thinking lends itself to action-research methods engaging with actors in the situation.’47 Wargames and role-playing may be simulations, but they do serve to ground our understanding of specific situations. To the degree that urban policy makers, planners and designers help create environments that allow strangers to live among one another, role-playing may bring in an aspect of professional practice that is otherwise absent or underdeveloped in the students’ training and education.

### AT: Nuclearism

#### Nuclear reps aren’t too bad

Wittner 17 (Lawrence, prof of history @ SUNY, cited by Duncan Meisel, "Mass Mobilization Stopped Nuclear War Before and It Can Again," Toward Freedom, 10-31-2017, <https://towardfreedom.org/archives/activism/mass-mobilization-stopped-nuclear-war-before-and-it-can-again>)

* threats good, fear good, demands key

A common thread running through the entire post-1945 period is that people don’t want to think about nuclear war. When they’re forced to think of it, when they can’t escape it, they want to stop it. But when it’s not in the headlines any more and governments are growing more reasonable, they’d just as well not think about it. If nuclear war did break out today, you can bet more people would focus on it, but, of course, we don’t want that war to have to take place. The peace movement’s challenge is to maintain its momentum and sense of danger — even though the world might seem safer and there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world. If the nations of the world are maintaining their arsenals, the struggle hasn’t come to an end. Do you think the moment we’re experiencing today with Trump and North Korea is potentially a driving force for another peak of movement energy? What’s different today? It’s possible that there will be some revival of the nuclear disarmament movement, but we haven’t seen the surge of resistance yet. I’m a co-chair of the national board of the group Peace Action, so I’m very well aware of how peace groups are doing. While Peace Action isn’t doing badly, we’re certainly not yet experiencing the surge of action in the streets, such as when its predecessors, SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, were taking off. One reason it’s not taking place is that the mass media rarely focus on the danger of nuclear war, and when they do focus on it, it’s the danger of some other country waging war on the United States. One day it’s Iran, another day it’s North Korea — but they don’t seem to get to the basic problem that nine countries have 15,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenals. It’s a worldwide phenomenon, as is the persistence of the idea of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security. Right now there’s also a sense that only Koreans are vulnerable, that most Americans aren’t at risk of being bombarded by nuclear missiles. At the height of popular protest in the 1980s, millions of people were in the streets — in part because U.S. and Soviet arsenals could reach both sides quite easily. That got people to wake up and realize that nuclear war wasn’t such a hot idea after all. How big a role did fear play in these spikes of organizing? How can people dealing with fear of the Trump administration, or of North Korean nuclear mobilization, help direct that energy into making nuclear conflict less likely? I think fear has probably been the most important factor in mobilizing people. When you look at things psychologically, people should be afraid of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. It seems irrational to go bury your head in the sand and not worry about them. But it’s also true, in two ways, that fear is dangerous. One is that it can be demobilizing, that people get so scared they’re scared silent. They become so frightened they retreat and they don’t feel powerful any more. They might take drugs instead of taking action. A second danger is that, if people are scared of nuclear war, the hawks have an answer for them. They turn fear on its head: Yes, they say, nuclear war could be a bad thing, that’s why we need nuclear weapons to deter the bad Russians, Iranians, North Koreans and so on. This means fear may reinforce the desire for nuclear weapons rather than for getting rid of them. For these reasons, the use of nuclear fear has to be very careful. Peace activists have to make the case that as long as nuclear weapons exist there’s no real security from nuclear war, and therefore we need to get rid of nuclear weapons. That’s the best case that can be made by nuclear disarmament forces: The arms race is a race no one wins. What are some of the forgotten “paths not taken” of weapons not built or decisions not made as a result of anti-nuclear organizing? How might the world be different if those things had been built? The neutron bomb was being proposed during the Carter administration. This enhanced radiation weapon was designed to destroy people rather than property, and was scheduled by the Carter administration to be deployed in Western European nations. But once peace groups learned of it and began to focus on its terrible effects, this caused massive protests in Western European nations and, eventually, an unwillingness to support the neutron bomb deployment by their government officials. As a result, the Carter administration finally concluded that, if Western governments weren’t willing to stand up for it, the U.S. government wasn’t going to be the villain of the piece. So Carter canceled plans for its deployment. The MX missile was the jewel in the crown of the Reagan administration during its first term of office. Peace groups said that it was a first-strike weapon, and there was so much popular protest against it that Reagan couldn’t get funding through Congress. Eventually, a plan that began as 200 missiles barely slipped through with 50 missiles. That failure became the basis of the U.S. government’s push for strategic arms reduction treaties, for it meant the U.S. government couldn’t keep pace with development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the next best thing was seeing to it that neither country had those weapons. The best way to do that was to sign a treaty: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which Gorbachev welcomed and showed him, in many ways, to be a peace person, strongly influenced by the movement. Gorbachev had his own peace-oriented ideas, but he also received a large amount of information from the disarmament movement in the United States and around the world. He would take time out of his meetings with heads of state to meet with representatives of groups like the Freeze campaign, SANE, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. So, Gorbachev and Reagan’s detente and the overall drawback from the nuclear brink were heavily influenced by the peace movement — not just through public pressure but also through direct engagement. Are there other potentially winnable campaigns of this kind available to anti-nuclear weapons activists today that might limit the likelihood of the Trump administration using nuclear weapons? It seems to me there are two ways to develop mass pressure on Trump and Congress in connection with the general problem of nuclear weapons. The first has to do with the trillion dollar nuclear “modernization” program — the plan to upgrade the entire nuclear weapons complex, build new bombers and missiles and submarines and so on. That cost is so great that it provides the opportunity to reach people who are already concerned about the arms race or are satisfied with the weapons we already have and don’t want to bankrupt the country. So you can make demands for cutbacks in the “modernization” plan or stopping it entirely and mobilize a sympathetic constituency. A second way is to focus on Trump’s mental instability: The fact that he’s a reckless, dangerous leader, who really shouldn’t have the button to launch nuclear war in his hand. That’s what the currently proposed Markey-Lieu bill seeks to address: Under its provisions, unless there’s a nuclear attack on the United States, the president cannot initiate nuclear war without a Congressional declaration of war. Since Congress hasn’t declared war since 1941, that’s a pretty big restriction.

### AT: Operational Warfare

#### Experts are credible, and don’t do any of that nasty operational warfare business.

Ravenal 9 – Professor Emeritus at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

Earl Ravenal, “Designing Defense for a New World Order,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects--- a.k.a. pork---funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities---at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)---for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups---about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”---not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation---is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points--- empirically---to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Operational warfare is useless as a concept and probably wrong

Chandler 9 (David, prof of IR @ westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics," Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf)

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

### AT: Reps Matter

#### Reps don’t shape reality and there’s no impact

Van Rythoven 19 (Eric, PhD from Carleton, Researcher @ journal of global security studies, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 7-16-2019, <https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/3/478/5532523?redirectedFrom=fulltext#137694797>)

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

The problem with this tragic vision is that it points to processes that are never entirely in our possession. Whether in the form of background knowledge (Pouliot 2008), habits (Hopf 2010), or routines (Mitzen 2006), much of social life occurs without conscious deliberation and reflection. These forms of unthinking action impair reflexivity and limit actors’ ability to see how the world might be different and thus how outcomes can be uncertain. In some cases, this can be benign, such as the unreflexive amity between Canada and the United States that allows these countries to “escape” from the traditional security dilemma (Collins 2014, 572–73). But just as practices of amity can be habitual, so too can enmity. The hawkish US senator may designate Iran’s nuclear program as threatening because that is what hawkish US senators do, and there is no perceived way to be hawkish otherwise. The result is that the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves becomes concealed under an unthinking veil of common sense. The tragedy of securitization then is not only that political figures often exceed their limitations by ignoring how contingency can derail securitizing moves—it is that these limitations often never even register

This means overcoming the tragedy of securitization require a certain degree self-reflexivity. This is similar to what Booth and Wheeler describe as the “security dilemma sensibility,” or an actor’s ability and willingness to reflect upon their actions, including one’s own role in provoking insecurity in others (2008, 7). By sensitizing leaders to how uncertainty is an endemic feature of political life, and how their actions can be interpreted in unintended ways, security competition can be mitigated, at least in part (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 265). Yet, these moments of self-awareness and reflection are difficult precisely because there are powerful forces that demand simplicity and closure: namely our desire for a stable sense of self or what is widely referred to as ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Reflecting on the uncertainty of international politics can erode one’s sense of identity and agency, ultimately leading to a “deep, incapacitating state of not knowing how to get by in the world” (Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 29). Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma sensibility may have the laudable goal of alerting leaders to the role of uncertainty in political life, but this confronts the problem that many would prefer that it remain hidden.

The consequence is that this tragic aspect of the securitization dilemma takes on an intractable character. Either unwilling or unable to “know one’s limits,” as Herz would say (1950, 179), the role of uncertainty becomes hidden and security claims appear as a reliable strategy for control and influence. Like the classic realist dilemma, the securitization dilemma is pervasive because it is often invisible. The compelling need for a logic of selflimitation—of a careful and reflective use of security language and how it can be derailed by contingency— is obscured because of an aversion to recognizinguncertainty. It is this specter of a need for reflection and restraint that may not be realized, I suggest, which demands that we rethink the role of the analyst in provoking reflexivity among power-holders.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Role of the Analyst

Motivated by the absence of unintended and perverse consequences in constructivist theorizing of security, this article has pursued a reconceptualization of the security dilemma. Viewing the dilemma as a logic of limitation shaped by choice, uncertainty, and tragedy, the argument focuses on transposing this logic to the constructivist context of securitization theory. By showing how the choice to engage in the social construction of threats is complicated by uncertainty and the tragic failure to recognize one’s own limits, the dilemma analytic helps us to understand how securitization can be both a potent instrument for mobilization, as well as a volatile source of unpredictability. Moreover, this conceptual lens lays the foundation for an ethical imperative of self-limitation among securitizing actors—albeit one made difficult given the desire for simplicity and closure. Far from a rebuke of constructivist theorizing, the argument shows that taking the social character of security seriously means appreciating how political claims are always vulnerable to being derailed by different types of contingency.

This reconstructive move has important implications for studying the social construction of security. First, while the initial influence of realism on securitization theory is well-documented (Floyd 2010; Gad and Peterson 2011), few attempts have been made to show how engaging with these realist roots can yield new insights.22 Here, the reconstruction of the security dilemma demonstrates how returning to realist themes can yield a fresh insights. Second, the argument pushes scholars studying securitization to expand their universe of outcomes beyond the reductive binary of success and failure and to consider cases of perverse and unintended consequences. Not only are these outcomes relatively common, they undercut the prevailing image of securitization as a reliable technology of control. Third, the securitization dilemma shows why uncertainty is more of an enduring problem for social action than constructivists typically acknowledge. Contra earlier arguments where learning and socialization effectively mitigate the problem of uncertainty (Wendt 2006, 208–9), this perspective stresses how contingency means that social acts like securitizing moves can have unpredictable effects.

The most important result of this reconstruction, however, may be in how taking the tragic element of the dilemma seriously reorders the political role of the analyst. Rather than assessing the validity of a particular security discourse, or exposing its socially constructed nature, this perspective asks the analyst to provoke reflexivity on behalf of power-holders over the risks associated with securitization. While this entails a bias toward deescalation and desecuritization, unlike other approaches this is not achieved through overt references to any liberal, democratic, or emancipatory ideal. Instead, it is packaged for power-holders as a strategy of self-preservation. Here, the analyst presents the move to securitize as a risk-laden and potentially self-defeating strategy. The analyst points to a series of precedents showing how such a strategy can produce perverse consequences: how today's tough talk can become tomorrow's liability; how audiences can interpret threatening messages in unexpected ways; and how today's framing of security can lead to perverse consequences tomorrow. By foregrounding the problem of uncertainty, the analyst works to accentuate and impress upon actors the dilemmatic quality of securitizing moves.

Yet, the problem with presenting the move to securitize as a risk is that it may become accepted. Ironically, framing an escalation in enmity as possible but dangerous is precisely what may legitimize such a move in the eyes of risk-insensitive actors. This is Huysmans’ (2002) now familiar normative dilemma of writing security. The indeterminacy of language means that political actors may interpret advice in unpredictable ways. Frustratingly, this may include the precise opposite of the analyst's intention. This situation is likely inescapable, but it may be mitigated. What I suggest is that analysts should strive to cultivate a deeper subjectivity of risk sensitivity, comparable to Booth and Wheeler's security-dilemma sensibility, among political actors.

Key to this argument is how visions of the future satisfy the human desire for certainty. As Berenskoetter argues, “visions depicting the self in an imagined future order serve as anxiety controlling mechanisms” (2011, 654). Visions of the future inoculate actors against the anxiety of uncertainty by providing a narrative of where they are going and how to get there. Indeed, normative debates on securitization are already loaded with such visions. The impulse to securitize is underpinned by a utopian future where the security frame can finally mobilize a response to an otherwise intractable problem. Conversely, the impulse to desecuritize is sustained by a dystopian future defined by unrestrained authoritarian politics. A tragic vision of the future does something different: it presents a future where the only thing we can know decisively is that it is indeterminate and attempts to conclusively control it are vulnerable to failure. The very recognition of fundamental limits on human freedom (Steele 2007, 281–82) becomes transformed into a source of ontological security. This tempers the human need for cognitive closure by reconfiguring it into what Herz understood as a “fundamentally humble posture toward the value and precariousness of life” (Sylvest 2008, 442). An actor with a greater sensitivity to indeterminacy may still pursue securitizing moves, but with a cautious awareness that they are volatile acts best pursued sparingly. The analyst does not simply educate political leaders by pointing to the indeterminacy of the world; she seeks to make political subjects more sensitive toward it by crafting visions of a precarious future.

Finally, this tragic vision cannot, and should not, escape its own need for reflexivity. Its scholarly proponents need to engage in their own process of self-reflection, focusing on how their knowledge and interests are themselves historically situated. The ethic of restraint is a value, and not necessarily the value for all historical circumstances. A recognition of the social construction of security “facts” must be sobered by a recognition of the social construction of security “values” (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 685).

### AT: Scenario Planning = Simulation

#### Scenario planning is integral to planning the future

Mellor 13, Ewan E. Ph.D. candidate, Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, 2013, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,”

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

#### Scenario planning within the context of USFG action is more likely to produce ethical students than unethical ones

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(“NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1)

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7∂ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

### AT: War is Simulation

#### War is not just simulation – they obfuscate the real material determinants of warfare and which guarantees escalating military interventions

Hobbs 06 – Lecturer in Media and Public Relations at the University of Newcastle

(Mitchell, “Reflections on the Reality of the Iraq Wars: The Demise of Baudrillard’s Search for Truth?,” https://www.academia.edu/2569231/Reflections\_on\_the\_reality\_of\_the\_Iraq\_Wars\_the\_demise\_of\_Baudrillards\_search\_for\_truth)

Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlightingthe relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, asmedia theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”. Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including theGulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use” (Kellner, 1989:73). In thisregard, Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the newsmedia, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism thatundermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner,1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra,and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within criticalsocial theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, workas “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies” In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives, circulating in aseemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solidmight melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or government ‘spin’. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, sociologists can, to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections. 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 REST IN PEACE BAUDRILLARD? In the final analysis, then, Baudrillard’s work on the Gulf War and the September 11terrorist attacks should (respectfully) be laid to rest. For although some, such as RichardKeeble (2004:43), have followed Baudrillard in arguing that “there was no war in the gulf in 2003”, such statements are somewhat antithetical to the truth aims of the social sciences. Baudrillard, being both an icon and iconoclast, pushed his language and arguments to rhetorical extremes in order to force the collapse of representations andarguments he saw as having supplanted truth. His fatal theory was in a sense intellectual ‘hype’, for a capricious world in which only ‘hype’ can be noticed. Yet in shouting his arguments he served to obfuscate their nuance and subtext, the very intellectualessences of his work and, ultimately, his contribution to the body of knowledge. However, although fatal theory is of little practical use for media researchers seeking anempirically derived ‘truth’, Baudrillard’s oeuvre is still (somewhat) instructive, remindingus of the importance of de-mystifying reality. For although the voice of the scholar is that of a pariah in the entertainment driven public sphere, we must force our voices into the public sphere if we are to re-contextualise events such as the Iraq war, by providing audiences with better, more veracious accounts of events. Failing this, we will continue to find our ‘defence’ forces engaged in military operations under spurious casus belli arguments. Accordingly, despite the many faults of his work, Baudrillard should not beforgotten. For although his contribution was more of a slap-of-the-face than a gentlepush in the right direction, his ideas regarding simulacra and reality have helped to further our understanding of media spectacles (and their potential repercussions). In apost-Baudrillard world, as social inquiry (it is to be hoped) returns to a more empiricallyinformed understanding of the media, we should not forget the implications posed by thiscultural field. For if sociology seeks to explain the social world, then it must work to prevent the dislocation of reality from the ‘real’ that Baudrillard so feared.

**Troll the Trolls DA**

Drinking low NOW

Abrams, **Abigail**. **5-17-17** “Teen Drinking Reaches Lowest Point in 25 Years, CDC Says.” Time, Time, https://time.com/4776249/teen-drinking-lowest-point-25-years-cdc/. 🐸

Teens are drinking significantly less than they used to. Underage **drinking** among teens **has reached a new low**, ABC News reports. The percent of teens who said they have at least one drink per month dropped from 50.8% in 1991 to just 32.8% in 2015 in a new report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Despite the overall decrease, researchers say binge drinking is still a problem. Of those teens who reported drinking, 57.8% said they had five drinks in a row, and 43.8% said they had drunk at least eight drinks in one sitting. Researchers examined data from the national Youth Risk Behavior Survey, which asks students to answer a self-administered questionnaire. The sample size ranged from 10,904 to 16,410 students between 1991 and 2015, according to ABC. The new report found that binge drinking among teens has decreased from a high of 31.5% of teens in 1999 to 17.7% of teens in 2015. Teen drinking has been falling for years, but the CDC and other groups are still concerned about underage drinking.

Baudrillard is not happy

Cussen, **James**. **4-30-22** “Why Baudrillard Hated the Matrix.” Medium, The Living Philosophy, medium.com/the-living-philosophy/why-baudrillard-hated-the-matrix-6052010375cd. 🐸

There are no longer external Omega points or any antagonistic means available in order to analyze the world; there is nothing more than [a fascinated adhesion](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=That%20is%20exactly,a%20fascinated%20adhesion.).” And so in our postmodern world there is no solid ground from which to criticise the system. Che Guevara has been legitimised as an icon of rebellious adolescents and sells millions of t-shirts and posters every year. Critiques of the system on social media only further enshrine the power of those technological monopolies. Resistance is futile. The system is all-engulfing. #3 A Glimmer of Irony In his third criticism, Baudrillard moves from criticising *The Matrix* for misunderstanding the idea of simulation, to criticising the movies for failing to understand his philosophy in general. He says that: “The pseudo-Freud who speaks at the film’s conclusion puts it well: at a certain moment, we reprogrammed the matrix in order to integrate anomalies into the equation. And you the resistors, comprise a part of it. Thus we are, it seems, within a total virtual circuit [without an exterior](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=The%20pseudo%2DFreud%20who%20speaks%20at%20the%20film%E2%80%99s%20conclusion%20puts%20it%20well%3A%20at%20a%20certain%20moment%2C%20we%20reprogrammed%20the%20matrix%20in%20order%20to%20integrate%20anomalies%20into%20the%20equation.%20And%20you%2C%).” Baudrillard is of course referring to the scene with the Architect at the end of the second movie *The Matrix Reloaded* [where the Architect explains](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHZl2naX1Xk) that the resistors in Zion are a part of the overall Matrix program. By giving rebellious outliers the illusion of autonomy and an escape into reality, they ensure the greater overall stability of the Matrix. But Baudrillard isn’t happy. His criticism is that the movies fail to enact his chosen form of rebellion which he summarises in the interview as: “a glimmer of irony that would allow viewers to turn this gigantic special effect [on its head](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/the-matrix-decoded-le-nouvel-observateur-interview-with-jean-baudrillard/#:~:text=a%20glimmer%20of%20irony%20that%20would%20allow%20viewers%20to%20turn%20this%20gigantic%20special%20effect%20on%20its%20head.)

Not being happy leads to drinking

Carol **Galbicsek 2-22-22** “Alcohol and Depression.” Alcohol Rehab Guidewww.alcoholrehabguide.org/resources/dual-diagnosis/alcohol-and-depression/. 🐸

This type of depression is linked to changes in light stemming from a shift in seasons. Typically, symptoms of SAD start to emerge in the fall and gradually worsen during the winter. Research shows that a lack of light during the winter months contributes to a case of the “winter blues”. Oftentimes, these gloomy moods shift to optimistic spirits through spring and summer. For a formal diagnosis, SAD symptoms must present themselves for at least the last two consecutive years.Symptoms of SAD include: Feeling sad and irritable most days Oversleeping Gaining or losing more weight than usual Experiencing changes in appetite Having a “heavy feeling” in arms and legs Alcohol can be used to achieve a temporary sense of pleasure during dreary months. However, frequent and excessive drinking can **lead to** a full-blown addiction that lingers long after fall and winter. This is because the body becomes dependent on the chemicals released by alcohol to achieve feelings of happiness. As a result, a person will begin to crave alcohol in order to achieve a feeling of satisfaction. Psychotic Depression A more severe form of depression, psychotic depression involves hallucinations, paranoia or delusions. This type of depression can cause individuals to hear voices or make them believe that someone is out to harm them. Some signs of psychotic depression are: Extreme mood swings Staying awake all night and sleeping all day Neglecting self-care, such as bathing Incoherent speech Combining **drinking** with psychotic depression can be extremely dangerous to one’s health and well-being, as well as those around them. Rather than providing a sense of calmness, alcohol actually exacerbates the symptoms of psychotic depression. A person’s paranoia intensifies dramatically while under the influence, resulting in bizarre behavioral outbreaks, mania and thoughts of suicide.

Drinking causes extinction

Noonan, **Robert**. **2-24-22** “Pharmacological Extinction.” SinclairMethod.org, Sinclair Method, 24 Mar. 2022, [www.sinclairmethod.org/pharmacological-extinction/](http://www.sinclairmethod.org/pharmacological-extinction/). 🐸

In the context of Alcohol Use Disorders, the problematic behavior is drinking alcohol and the reward is the release of endorphins. This behavior has been rewarded each and every time you’ve had a drink your entire life. The solution is to withhold the treat–the pleasurable buzz–until your brain learns that it will no obtain the expected reward it’s seeking. When your brain learns that **drinking** no longer **results in** a pleasurable reward, extinction has occurred. But **extinction** with the Sinclair Method does not happen overnight. Factors That Influence the Rate of Extinction Extinction can be more complex, though, especially in adults who have developed ingrained behaviors that produce harmful consequences (e.g. alcoholism). This is why it’s important to understand how to influence the rate of extinction. A behavior does not have to be rewarded every single time it occurs, in order for it to continue. Rewards that are given at regular or irregular intervals are highly reinforcing as well

## Links to Counter Ks

### Cap Bad Link

#### Invoking simulacra is a capitalist ploy to distract from materialism

**Schwabach 3** (Aaron Schwaback @ Jefferson School of Law - Professor of Law and Director of Center for Global Legal Studies, J.D., University of California at Berkeley Published : 2003, <jonah> <IKS> “Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law,” DOA: 7-8-16, pages 1-21)

Although this theme has attained the status of a cliche, one carefullydeveloped depiction is that in Joe Haldeman’s novel Forever Peace.78 The story’s protagonist, Julian Class, is a University of Texas professor and U.S. Army sergeant who spends ten days each month remotely operating a military robot metonymically (and ironically) called a soldierboy. Together Class and the soldierboy **form a cyborg** – a concept often linked in fiction and criticism with problems of identity. 79 Class, in the person of the soldierboy, fights against third-world guerrillas who, unlike him, **are actually present.** In one disturbing scene, he and his fellow soldiers discuss having killed two ten-year-old girls who fired upon the soldierboys.80 The girls could not have inflicted serious damage on the robot, and, of course, could not have injured Class or his fellow operators, who were far away and safe at the time. The scene could have been written in response to Baudrillard’s solipsistic view of virtual war as nothing more than non-intersecting simulacra – for Baudrillard, the simulacral war that the “Americans” experienced **never mirrored that experienced by Saddam Hussein**: “[T]he two adversaries did not even confront each other face to face, the one lost in its virtual war won in advance, the other buried in its traditional war lost in advance.”81 Haldeman’s reader, however, is left with the horrified awareness that, while Class’s war is a simulacrum, **the little girl’s death is real. Inhabiting worlds of simulacra** is a **luxury** enjoyed by **academics from wealthy countries, like Jean Baudrillard** and Julian Class, one of whom may be no more and no less real than the other. **Those who actually risk death** in war, though, **enjoy no such luxury**, but **must believe in the reality** of war and their own existence.

#### Baudrillard is wrong – class struggle cannot be defined by signs when signs don’t control the world

**McWhinney 21** (Andrew McWhinney @ Negation Mag - Editor, writer, podcast producer for Negation Mag, MA from McMaster University, Published: March 2021, <IKS> "A Marxist Mission to Rescue Jean Baudrillard", DOA: 6-23-2022, <https://www.negationmag.com/articles/marxist-mission-rescue-baudrillard>)

SIGN FETISHISM: ISSUES WITH BAUDRILLARD'S THOUGHT While there are plenty of useful and practical insights to be found in the work of early Baudrillard, there are also many worrisome tendencies that begin to show themselves in said texts. In FCPES, Baudrillard asserts multiple times that modern capitalism has put its core emphasis on sign value and the reproduction of the system through the dogmatic (re)production of the code. For Baudrillard, "sign exchange value is fundamental — use value is often no more than a practical guarantee;" he intends for this to be a critique of a supposed ahistorical view of human needs that Marxists uphold.15 Reacting to this perceived ahistoricism, Baudrillard simply ends up bending the stick too far in the opposite direction. One only needs to look to Marx in Capital, Vol. 1, to combat this over-enthusiastic stick-bending. Marx states that "the commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind. The nature of these needs, whether they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference."16 It is clear that Marx never saw use values as fulfilling static human needs; indeed, in Marx’s conception, human needs are subject to social-historical transformation, and are fulfilled by social use values. There is thus no need, as Baudrillard does, to disregard use values as ahistorical and false, nor is there a need to conceive of use value as a purely discursive guarantor of exchange value. Sign value is simply that part of the commodity, one might say, that fulfills that social-imaginative need of fitting into a particular position in the capitalist social hierarchy, which is explained by the link between sign value and use value (SgEV-UV). Baudrillard’s totalizing view of sign value and the code also poses two other problems; it is vaguely defined yet monolithic. Baudrillard seems to think that the code of capitalist society — that of political economy — is singular, without contradiction. This is just not true. As Valentin Vološinov states in his work Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e., by the class struggle. Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle.17 Signs are not singular in their meaning, but multiaccentual — they are overdetermined by a multiplicity of codes (class, race, gender, sexuality and so on), and the sign value of a commodity may differ according to how it speaks to these codes. Baudrillard’s monolithic formulation of the code is actually what Vološinov points to as the goal of the ruling class: "to extinguish or drive the inward struggle between social value judgements which occurs in [the sign], to make [it] uniaccentual."18 Forgoing the sign as a site of class struggle, Baudrillard wishes to abandon the logic of the sign altogether, substituting it for what he calls "symbolic exchange." Symbolic exchange, while taking on various definitions in Baudrillard’s thought,19 most concretely refers to any social practice that defies the "repressive, reductive, rationalizing metaphysic of utility."20 Pulling from Georges Bataille’s theory of the general economy21 and Marcel Mauss’s analysis of gift economies,22 Baudrillard sees symbolic exchange as that which defies the equalizing, totalizing logic of the sign – it is ambivalent to the logic of value as such, and acts as the radical negation of the value systems of capitalist society, allowing for the destruction of (sign) value logic and the possibility for other ways of being in the world to emerge. Practices of symbolic exchange for Baudrillard include gift-giving, sacrifice, and excessive festivities. As Baudrillard put it, "the symbolic social relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the consumption of the ‘surplus’ and deliberate anti-production."23 As Douglas Kellner has noted, the politics of symbolic exchange are similar to the politics of difference and the micropolitics of desire advocated by many of Baudrillard’s contemporaries. The issue with Baudrillard’s version of this politics, however, is that it comes up against his own monolithic, all-consuming, all-encompassing conception of the code, which can seemingly co-opt and absorb all opposition. Thus, as Kellner notes, Baudrillard can only advocate a vague, unhelpful, ultra-leftist practice of "total refusal, total negativity and the utopia of radical otherness;" a position which forgoes any possibility for a material revolution.24 Baudrillard’s sign fetishism only proceeds to get worse over time. Forgoing even the notion of a critical political economy of the sign, Baudrillard later comes to believe that the reproduction of society no longer centres on reproducing the mode of production, but the code itself: The other production, that of values and commodities, that of the belle epoque of political economy, has for a long time had no specific meaning. What every society looks for in continuing to produce, and to overproduce, is to restore the real that escapes it. That is why today this "material" production is that of the hyperreal itself.25 There is no longer a "real" base where production takes place. There is only a "hyperreal," something that appears more real than the real world itself — we live, according to Baudrillard, in a world smoothed of all its real contradictions, and where apparent contradictions merely exist to perpetuate an illusion of what our society is supposed to look like. Taken to its most nihilistic conclusions in Fatal Strategies (1983), this theory asserts that objects have come to rule subjects, and the social has officially been wiped out. We as subjects must accept this defeat and adopt objecthood ourselves. What is probably most compelling about Baudrillard to many — including post-leftist TikTokers — is what feels like the descriptive power of some of the borderline science-fiction predictions he makes in works like Fatal Strategies. With the development of the internet and its acceleration of communication, it can often feel for middle-class young people that they are living out most of their lives in the hyperreal. The code of corporate social media spaces seems to pull them in, hijack their sense of belonging, and render them passive consumers of content. All media has become seemingly cool — cold, even — and them along with it. For young people who have grown up with the internet as a core part of their social experiences, this can feel all too real. Alienation, for us, is automatically linked to the sensation of simulation, the proliferation of the code, and not immediately identified with material strife. The issue here, however, is that the world has not been reduced to the code. The development and proliferation of hierarchical sign-systems, the building blocks of ideology, quilted through the power of material institutions in the capitalist mode of production, is undeniable. There is certainly a different ideological apparatus to contend with that requires new thinking and modes of analysis to comprehend fully. But there is still a material base co-constituted with this ideological apparatus; there is still material exploitation at the site of capitalist labour, and the extraction of surplus value is still central to reproduction of capitalist society. Exploitation of labour and the labour of consumption under late capitalism are both significant and central experiences of the subject in advanced capitalist societies; consumption on its own is not. In his sign fetishism and monolithic conception of the code, Baudrillard ended up taking the side of capital, erasing any potential for resistance against capitalism.

### Fem K Link

#### Baudrillard’s theory essentializes and valorizes the feminine and reproduces explicit binaries that subjugates and undermines women

A Keith Goshorn, critical theorist, associate professor of sociology at colgate university, Baudrillard: A Critical Reader, edited by Douglas Kellner, 1994, pg. 258-260

Yet more crucial than the above general considerations should be an examination of **Baudrillard’s rather careless employment of a category of “the feminine,**” particularly in constructing one of his central theoretical figures, **the notion of seduction.**this usage of “the feminine” here and elsewhere in his writing surely appears, on the surface, to be **risking a narrowly essentialized definition of** the term, and one drawn *from* the social postures of a previous century at that. Worse, he might be said to be participating in a continued “metaphorization” of **the feminine**,3 which marks the distancing and objectification of women as Other-ness. Seen in this light, his posture would only be typical of a long history of male philosophers trying to “place into discourse” an idealized or imaginary “feminine” while remaining relatively indifferent to or ignorant of the status of the “real” women around them. Furthermore, can he also fairly be charged with **employing an outmoded binary and oppositional sense of masculine/feminine polarity** — even though he is obviously trying to exca­vate through the theory of seduction a strategy which, even in the words of his harshest critics, seems to ... . subvert ... fixed dualities between masculine and feminine”4? **The charges of his allegedly essentialized usage of femininity (and masculinity) must be weighed not against any possible ameliorations by elder male generational oversight** (if it is indeed only that), but against the possibility that his intention has been rather to deconstruct the historical function of the *category* itself and how **it** has supposedly been used. From this perspective, his aim is not primarily to create a discourse of female submission, but to develop a counterfactual sub-discourse which set an overt agenda by which masculine prerogatives have only constructed themselves in defensive and insecure postures against a naturally superior female order and its dominant set of “secret” goals. While any, even preliminary, understanding of his precarious position here will require some defining extrapolations of what a deliberately uncipherable and non-representative theory of seduction represents, a fair-minded critique will require some speculation as to what purpose the author intended by such a theory as well as a judgment of its results. One must then determine what advantages and disadvantages Baudrillard has given himself in trying to counter the tyranny of the rationalist productivist ethic with language drawn from a long-passed epoch rife with sexist and “aristocratic overtones. And, finally, we can ask whether he may be wisely obliged to abandon an unworkable theory of seduction in his at­tempt to formulate a subversive counter-weight to the dominating mode of capitalist productivism. And, regardless of our judgment on any of the above, at this point in time, our attention is merited by any theorist who undertakes to question and challenge, even indirectly, the cultural foun­dations of the religion of “free market economy” which, along with its semiotic viruses of commercial promotionalism and the commodification of discourse, have so thoroughly naturalized themselves into nearly all aspects of contemporary life, especially its discourse of “sexuality.” Baudrillard deserves further scrutiny from feminists most particularly here for his attention to the exchange value basis of traditional sexuality and its reflection of capitalist objectification, paradoxically reproduced by its emphasis on individualist “subjectivity” or subjective “individualism.” For this sexuality as feminists have known all along, is tainted as a sub-set derivative of what Baudrillard calls “the abjection of free enterprise.” Although it is unavoidably necessary in addressing the issues at stake in this essay to use the conventional distinctions of “male” critics and “fe­male” critics, I do not intend to suggest in any way a grouping of qualities around or inherent to either. Likewise, I do not mean to imply anything necessarily synonymous between “women” and “feminists,” even if these two do occasionally get thrown together here. Furthermore, it should be obvious by now that to be a feminist is not to automatically belong to one gender or the other. Indeed, one of the foremost points I hope to establish is that **Baudrillard’s continuance in identifying women only with certain universalized “feminine” qualities is a severely detrimental limitation to the overall more-radical intentions of his theoretical project.6**This becomes evident when we begin to see the contradictions that result from his ac­ceptance of the Freudian axiom of a single, masculine libido theory of sexuality implicit in his early writings on seduction, in contrast to his later theorizations of entering a condition of *transsexuality* which begin to resonate with the more progressive feminist notions of gender as a culturally learned performativity. His notion of transsexuality is but an aspect of a greater cultural movement of *transvestism,* which is the term he utilizes to characterize the implosion of previous fixed cultural polarities into what he sees as our current state of *indeterminacy.7* Ultimately, more is at stake here than simply deciding whether Baudrillard has made sexist remarks, held onto essentialized notions of women and “the feminine,” or has been a deliberately antagonistic provocateur of feminism and the social movements for women’s “liberation.” What fi­nally matters in the resolution of such questions is whether significantly new currents of thought have arisen which have possibly erased the need or the basis for past antagonisms. The one thing which I would assert with some certainty at the outset is that both the adherents of the multiple strains of today’s feminism as well as the multiple adherents of Baudrillard’s theoretical project will be far better off if they can listen to and learn from each other. For the French theorist is no more a ‘traditional male’ than he is the embodment of his self-described ‘supreme femininity.’ **And the most alert of today’s feminists no more see themselves as a group of non-liberated “autonomous feminine subjects” than they are a group of “non-seductive female phallocrats” as seen in the eyes of some of their detractors.**

### Repo. Futurism Link

#### Baudrillard’s theory of the Hyper-real is inscribed within notions of *Reproductive Futurism*-a simulacrum which is self-replicating, repetitive, and meaningless- seeing Queer bodies as functionally “useless” and future negating because they do not possess the *natural* capacity for sexual reproduction.

Edelman 04(Lee Edelman, Professor of English and Tuft University, Professor Edelman’s research focuses on fields of intersection between sexuality, rhetoric, culture, politics, and film, December 6th 2004, No Future: Quuer Theory and the Death Drive, Sinthomosexuality, pg 60-66) SY

This paradox determines the trajectory of a recent essay by Jean Baudrillard that was published under the deliberately inflammatory title, ‘‘The Final Solution.’’ Baudrillard asserts that the human species is confronting a life-and-death crisis around the question of reproduction, more specifically, around its determination by way of sameness or difference. But a vortex of contradictions engulfs his use of these various terms, occasioning, or rather seeming to occasion, a transvaluation of values in accordance with which they appear to signify against our expectations: ‘‘There is something occulted inside us: our deaths. But something else is hidden there, lying in wait for us within each of our cells: the forgetting of death. **In our cells our immortality lies in wait for us. It’s common to speak of the struggle of life against death, but there is an inverse peril. And we must struggle against the possibility that we will not die. At the slightest hesitation in the fight for death—a fight for division, for sex, for alterity, and so for death—living beings become once again indivisible, identical to one another—and immortal**.’’49 Far from speaking, with the sinthomosexual, for the death drive and its disarticulation of forms, **Baudrillard remains an advocate here of reproductive futurism, explicitly enlisting this notion of death, this resistance to immortality, against the force of the death drive, which he assimilates to, and disavows as, the paradigm of sameness: ‘‘The death drive, according to Freud, is precisely this nostalgia for a state before the appearance of individuality and sexual differentiation, a state in which we lived before we became mortal and distinct from one another’’** (interesting) (). He may trumpet what he calls here the ‘‘fight for death’’ in thus opposing himself to the death drive, disparaged as eternal pursuit of the Same and hence as immortality, but opprobrium, in Baudrillard’s argument, still attaches to the death drive only insofar as it constitutes a mortal threat to the survival of the human—insofar, that is, as its sameness might make human difference different. The immortality for which he reproves it, then, threatens the human precisely with a death he would have us fight against. It names the endless negation of form, and so of what, for Baudrillard, defines the value of ‘‘difference’’: that is, our distinctly human identity. As he sketches an evolutionary movement from ‘‘the absolute continuity found in the subdivision of the same—in bacteria—to the possibility of life and death’’ (), by which latter phrase he indicates the attributes of sexual reproduction, **Baudrillard, complicit with tendencies of scientific discourse in general, celebrates the triumph of sexed reproduction over genetic duplication in a teleological narrative that itself reduplicates the Freudian account of genitality’s triumph over the various ‘‘partial’’ drives.** Naturalizing this trajectory from the replication he associates with genetic immortality to the procreation made possible by encountering sexual, and therefore genetic, difference, Baudrillard sounds the note of futurism’s persistent love song to itself, its fantasy of a dialectic capable of spinning meaning out of history, and history out of desire: Next [after the evolutionary moment of bacterial replication], the egg becomes fertilized by a sperm and specialized sex cells make their appearance. The resulting entity is no longer a copy of either one of the pair that engendered it; rather, it is a new and singular combination. **There is a shift from pure and simple reproduction to procreation: the first two will die for the first time, and the third for the first time will be born. We reach the stage of beings that are sexed, differentiated, and mortal.** The earlier order of the virus—of immortal beings—is perpetuated, but henceforward this world of deathless things is contained within the world of the mortals. In evolutionary terms, the victory goes to beings that are mortal and distinct from one another: the victory goes to us. () **Or goes to ‘‘us’’ so long as ‘‘we’’ don’t identify—or get identified by others—with the regressive ‘‘order of the virus,’’** of immortal sameness or repetition, that threatens ‘‘us’’ with the sort of death Baudrillard refuses to embrace (a death through viral replication like that associated with what was referred to, twenty years ago, as ‘‘the gay plague’’): **‘‘This is the revenge taken on mortal and sexed beings by immortal and undifferentiated life forms. This is what could be called the final solution’’** (). Thus death, the corollary of difference, can function as a value for Baudrillard in the context of individual identities alone (because this, after all, allows for the Couple’s dialectical survival in the ‘‘third ’’); it retains its negative valence where the species itself is concerned.50 The latter’s impulse to immortality, to perpetuating its self-perpetuation through the mechanics of genetic exchange, must resist the backward appeal of ‘‘involution,’’ which signifies, for Baudrillard, the regressive ‘‘nullification of differences’’ **(). It must, that is, remain the same in its difference from the lethal sameness it condemns for its nullification of difference, thus affirming as constant the One of the Couple and the fantasy of the sexual relation as the ‘‘duality that puts an end to perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same’’ ()**. Unless, of course, such iterations of the same put an end to it instead. And that, according to Baudrillard, is precisely what ‘‘sexual liberation’’ intends: The first phase of sexual liberation involves the dissociation of sexual activity from procreation through the pill and other contraceptive devices—a transformation with enormous consequences. The second phase, which we are beginning to enter now, is the dissociation of reproduction from sex. First, sex was liberated from reproduction; today it is reproduction that is liberated from sex, through asexual, biotechnological modes of reproduction such as artificial insemination or full body cloning. **This is also a liberation, though antithetical to the first. We’ve been sexually liberated, and now we find ourselves liberated from sex—that is, virtually relieved of the sexual function. Among the clones (and among human beings soon enough), sex, as a result of this automatic means of reproduction, becomes extraneous, a useless function.** ()) The meaning of ‘‘sex,’’ which Baudrillard had identified earlier as a mode of reproduction (‘‘sexed, differentiated, and mortal’’) distinct from that of ‘‘deathless things’’ (such as viruses and bacteria) by virtue of its mingling of genes to create ‘‘new and singular combination[s],’’ undergoes an important mutation here. How else to explain his odd characterization of artificial insemination as ‘‘asexual’’ and (continuous in this with cloning) as reproduction ‘‘liberated from sex’’? **For whatever the mechanism by which it’s achieved—and ‘‘artificial’’ seems largely a diacritical term intended to naturalize the procreative function of heterosexual intercourse—**insemination, the fertilization of egg by sperm, defines the very principle of sexual reproduction for Baudrillard. **But the evolutionary argument for genetic combination (the essay’s original meaning of ‘‘sex’’) has morphed, as it often seems to do, into a panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation (the subsequent meaning of ‘‘sex’’).**What can the lament for the putative loss of the sexual function mean, therefore, if not its very opposite: that heterosexuality, stripped of its ancient reproductive alibi, must assume at last the despiritualized burden of its status as sexual function, as sinthomosexuality; that in the face of what Baudrillard calls ‘‘automatic’’ or ‘‘biotechnological’’ modes of reproduction, it must recognize the ‘‘extraneous’’ element in sex that is never extraneous to sex and that marks it as a ‘‘useless function,’’ as a meaningless and unrecuperable expense, or even, as Jacques Derrida has written with regard to différance, ‘‘as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct.’’51 Like Faron, the narrator of The Children of Men, for whom sex in a world without procreation—without ‘‘the hope of posterity, for our race if not for ourselves’’—becomes ‘‘almost meaninglessly acrobatic,**’’ Baudrillard recoils in horror before this ‘‘useless’’ sexuality. And a ‘‘useless function’’ for Baudrillard, as his use of the same phrase elsewhere suggests, means one that refuses meaning:** ‘‘At the extreme limit of computation and the coding and cloning of human thought (artificial intelligence), language as a medium of symbolic exchange becomes a definitively useless function**. For the first time in history we face the possibility of a Perfect Crime against language, an aphanisis of the symbolic function.’’52** Aphanisis, the term Ernest Jones introduced to identify the anxiety-inducing prospect of the disappearance of desire, refers in the passage from Baudrillard to the fading or, more ominously, to what he describes as the **‘‘global extermination of meaning’’**, the unraveling of the braid inwhich reproductive futurism twines meaning, desire, and the fantasy of(hetero)sexual rapport. At the same time, though, it also evokes the subsequent use of theword by Lacan, for whom it refers instead to the fading or disappearance of the subject,whose division the signifier effects in such a way that ‘‘there is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject.’’ Lacan will then go on to add, ‘‘There is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which is that of the unconscious.’’53 Meaning, that is, against whose aphanisis Baudrillard’s jeremiad is launched, always already entails, for Lacan, the aphanisis of the unconscious: ‘‘When the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading,’ as disappearance’’ (). Appalled by the imminence of a ‘‘final solution,’’ the liberation from sexual difference intended by the force of ‘‘perpetual indivision and successive iterations of the same,’’ Baudrillard holds fast to the meaning whose ‘‘global extermination’’ sinthomosexuality is always imagined to effect and whose Symbolic exchange jouissance would reduce to a ‘‘definitively useless function.’’54 **And he does so in the hope of perpetuating the temporal movements of desire, of shielding himself from the unconscious**(and the iterations of the drive, and securing, through futurity, through the victory of narrative duration over irony’s explosive negativity, a ground on which to stand: ‘‘The stakes,’’ he warns, ‘‘are no longer only that ‘history’ is slipping into the ‘posthistorical,’ but that the human race is slipping into the void’’ (). And all because (heterosexual) sex has ‘‘become extraneous, a useless function,’’ has become, that is, void of content once the inspiriting meaning it carried—both like, and in the form of, a Child—has vanished into the unregenerate materiality of the signifier.55 For ‘‘the signifier,’’ as Lacan declares in his interpretation of ‘‘The Purloined Letter,’’ ‘‘is not functional’’; it exceeds its use-value in the service of signification and, especially as localized in what the essay punningly engages as ‘‘the letter,’’ it brings us back to the Real, to the fatality of ‘‘what remains of a signifier when it has no more signification.’’56 Apostrophizing just such a signifier, Lacan, in his reading of Poe’s short story, makes clear just what SINTHOMOSEXUALITY 65 Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/615833/9780822385981-002.pdf by UNIV OF PENNSYLVANIA user on 09 March 2021 remains: ‘‘nothing, if not that presence of death which makes a human life a reprieve obtained from morning to morning in the name of the meanings whose sign is your crook’’ (). **Baudrillard, like Silas Marner and Scrooge, may walk through the valley of the shadow of death, but with meaning as his shepherd he shall always want, desiring from morning to morning the continuation of the reprieve by which he perpetuates the fantasy space essential to his desire.** ‘We see no white winged angels now,’’ George Eliot observes. ‘‘But yet men are led away from threatening destruction: a hand is put in theirs, which leads them forth gently towards a calm and bright land, so that they look no more backward; and that hand may be a little child’s.’’ Or rather, though that Child be as helpless as Eppie, as delicate as Tiny Tim, it must be the hand of a ‘‘little child’’ that lifts us into the future and thereby saves us, in the words of Baudrillard, from ‘‘slipping into the void’’ of all that is ‘‘backward’’ or ‘‘involuted,’’ of all that he condemns as ‘‘successive iterations of the same’’ that are, themselves, precisely what old Mr. Lammeter knows we value in the Eppies and Tiny Tims who embody reproductive futurism. As those faces of Eppie and Tiny Tim turn their eyes to us once more, soliciting the compassion that always compels us to want to keep them safe (in the faith that they will confer on us the future’s saving grace), let me end with a reference to the ‘‘Fourteen Words,’’ attributed to David Lane, by which members of various white separatist organizations throughout the United States affirm their collective commitment to the common cause of racial hatred: ‘‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.’’57 So long as ‘‘white’’ is the only word that makes this credo appalling, so long as figural children continue to ‘‘secure [our] existence’’ through the fantasy that we survive in them, so long as the queer refutes that fantasy, effecting its derealization as surely as an encounter with the Real, for just so long must sinthomosexuality have a future after all. For what keeps it alive, paradoxically, is the futurism desperate to negate it, obedient in that to the force of a drive that is futurism’s sinthome.

### Set Col Links

#### Baudrillard’s critique of spectacle and images fails to trace the genealogy of such events ultimately reifying the colonization of everyday life.

Jelly-Schapiro 18 (Eli, Associate Professor of English at the University of South Carolina, *“Security and Terror: American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity*,” This Is Our Threnody”: Writing History as Catastrophe, (2018), 6/27/22 - FI)

The conjoined critiques of spectacle, exception, and imperial capital, though, are unevenly revelatory of the colonial essence and history of contemporary culture and politics. This unevenness is an effect of theory’s symptomatic nature—the ways in which theory often echoes the form of its critical object. The works I critically engage in this chapter are exemplary instances of this formal echo. In their critiques of spectacle, Jean Baudrillard and Slavoj Žižek **reproduce the ahistoricity of the image,** leaving **untraced the genealogical** routes that connect commodity ascendance in the postcolonial metropole to the pure **articulation of commodity rationality in the colony**. In their theorizations of bare life and the state of exception, meanwhile, Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler affirm the exceptionalism of the War on Terror’s political technologies. Finally, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s critique of an emergent imperial order adopts two abiding tropes of the “globalization” concept: the assumption of an imminent or achieved planetarity—the disappearance of the “outside” that is essential to colonial rationality—and the assumption that the defining political forms of this globalism originate in the advanced capitalist world. Spectacle, Capital, Terror As theorized by Theodor Adorno and others, the mass violence of the twentieth century redefined the aesthetic and political implications of the sublime. Kant and Burke recognized that performances of political violence could produce the sublime, but they reserved the term “nature” for the non-human world. Writing in the eighteenth century, they did not see, or anticipate, the profound reification of social life under capital—the ways in which historically contingent social relations, and the violence inherent therein, are rendered by the mythos of capital as natural. In the context of this “second nature,” the sublime acquires a different resonance and effect. Spectacular instances of political violence, and indeed the relentless spectacle of commodity culture, do not permit the second moment in Kant’s dynamic sublime, wherein human reason and rationality reasserts its dominance over the irrationality of nature—because the irrationality of “second nature” violence is inextricable from rationality itself, and because there is no longer a position of safe remove, an outside, from which one can regard and redeem the sublime. 4 The naturalization of commodity rationality was a key concern of the thinkers of the Situationist International. Guy Debord published his seminal Society of the Spectacle in 1967. Debord named, in that book’s title and in its interior contents, a new form of capitalism based on the subjection of ever more realms of human social life to the rationality of the market. In so doing he described one of the defining characteristics of neoliberalism before the neoliberal era had properly begun. (Most historians of neoliberalism locate its inception in the early 1970s.) The prescience of Debord’s critique, and the endurance of the state of affairs he highlighted and foretold, has ensured that the Society of the Spectacle remains a relevant text, one with much to say about the culture and techniques of contemporary capital accumulation. The “colonization of everyday life” was enabled by the ascent of the image—as a commodity in itself and as a screen that conceals, like a fetish, the reality of capitalist social relations. Debord’s use of the term “colonization”—and Henri Lefebvre’s echo of it—might be read as proposing an obfuscatory analogy between the radically different modalities of commodity rationality in the colony and metropole. His choice of metaphor, though, evinces the historical articulation of, rather than collapses the distance between, colony and metropole. Invoking “colonization” rather than simply “commoditization” evokes the dialectical relation between the violence of extractive industry in the space of the colony and the saturation by the commodity form of all spheres of human social life in the consumerist societies of the overdeveloped world. It points, in other words, toward the history of colonial violence that conditions—is synchronically and diachronically connected to—cultures of alienation and exploitation in the postcolonial metropole Reflecting the televisual glare of the Twin Towers’ collapse, several widely cited theoretical texts composed in the near aftermath of September 11 summon Debord’s critique—notably Jean Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism (2002), Slavoj Žižek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002), and the Retort group’s Afflicted Powers (2004). The contemporary critique of spectacle confronts the same theoretical aporia negotiated by Debord: How to highlight the primacy of the image without submitting to its power? How to reveal the ubiquity of commodity culture without reinforcing its omnipotence and reproducing it’s a historicity? The Retort group observes that “the **colonization of everyday life”** is simply “‘**globalization’ turned inward**.” 5 The contemporary **critique of spectacle**, I want to argue, mimics rather than resists this **inward turning**. The violence of spectacle expresses itself in both subjective and objective forms. Subjective violence, as Žižek has outlined this distinction, refers to “violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent”—the violence that shows up on the evening news, the violence that disrupts the peaceful workings of everyday social and political order. 6 Objective violence, by contrast, refers to the often-invisible violence of the system itself—the pervasive and perpetual violence of capital in its globalized form. Spectacular instances of subjective violence serve one of two contradictory purposes. The dramatic car accident viewed by millions on YouTube distracts from rather than directs our attention to the slow ecological violence of automobile culture. But the logic of the terrorist attack—and indeed, as Retort cites, that of “the ruined small farmer from South Korea, slashing his arteries in defiance on the barricades at Cancun” 7 —avows that another form of subjective violence is possible, one that will cut through the thick screens of fetishism and reification. The potentiality of the “image-event” in exposing and resisting the objective violence of commodity culture is one central concern of the contemporary critique of spectacle. “The events in New York,” Baudrillard writes in The Spirit of Terrorism , “have radicalized the relation of the image to reality. Whereas we were dealing before with an uninterrupted profusion of banal images and seamless flow of sham events, the terrorist act in New York has resuscitated both images and events.” 8 The meeting of image and event, though, is not seamless. “At the same time that [images] exalt the event,” Baudrillard contends, “they also take it hostage. They serve to multiply it to infinity and . . . are a diversion and neutralization. . . . The image consumes the event, in the sense that it absorbs it and offers it for consumption.” 9 The force of the real event is correlated to the symbolic power of its proliferation as image. But the reduction of the event to its image denies the experience of the event as reality. Baudrillard elaborates this paradox by suggesting that the destruction of the Twin Towers elucidated the contest between, and entwined nature of, reality and fiction. For many observers, Baudrillard notes, September 11, 2001, represented the “resurgence of the real . . . in an allegedly virtual universe” (a resurgence that corresponded with “the resurrection of history beyond its proclaimed end”). Baudrillard is wary of this reading, however, and insists instead that if reality appears, in the event of the Twin Towers’ collapse, to overtake fiction, “this is because it has absorbed fiction’s energy, and has itself become fiction.” 10 The image precedes and surpasses the real event: “Rather than the violence of the real being there first, and the frisson of the image being added to it, the image is there first, and the frisson of the real is added.” 11 The image delivers the real. In other words, the violence of September 11 does not represent the return of history or the return of the real. It represents, rather, the triumph of the symbolic. In **Baudrillard’s reading**, the image-event of September 11 was **empty of political content**. The political aims of its actors, the historical forces from which it emerged and to which it responds—all of this is eclipsed by the image. Every replay of the towers falling serves to further evacuate the event of its historical and political meaning. Yet in making this observation so central to his account, Baudrillard finds himself stuck in something of a critical cul-de-sac. His emphasis on September 11 as **spectacle**—and his corresponding neglect of the concrete social relations within which the spectacle operates—serves to **reinforce** rather than resist the **fetishism of the image**. The question his account ultimately prompts, then, is how to “[preserve] intact the unforgettable incandescence of the image” 12 without being blinded by it. This is not to condemn or dismiss Baudrillard’s essay—a slim and narrow volume that does not aspire to any kind of comprehensive reading of global politics—but to shed light upon the ways in which the **dominance of the image is reprised** in the moment of critique.

#### In Baudrillard’s work we can trace we can trace a neo-primitivism logic – as a projection of the western fantasy.

Li 06 (Victor, an award-winning multimedia journalist based in Chicago, “*The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity*,” Primitivism without Primitives, or Towards Alterity, Culture, and Modernity, (2006), 6/27/22 - FI)

Neo-primitivism as a primitivism without primitives will logically seek to dismiss or drop the term ‘primitivism’ altogether. It is, after all, a problematic term that some anthropologists as early as the 1940s sought to eliminate altogether from their vocabulary. 121 But though the term may be dropped, a primitivist deep structure that privileges the Other of modernity – an Other that critically interrogates the modern – is retained. The disappearance of the term ‘primitivism,’ like the vanished or vanishing primitive, is thus not so much a complete effacement as a displacement and transposition onto other terms or concepts that now occupy the oppositional role to modernity that primitivism once did. I will examine in the chapters that follow how primitivism has been displaced into three new terms: alterity, culture, and, paradoxically, modernity. That alterity should be a form of neo-primitivism is perhaps not so surprising. A postmodern ethics of alterity has sensitized us to the dangers of ethnocentric claims to universal sameness. Particular, local forms of otherness have been mobilized in the struggle against the universalizing metanarratives of a Eurocentric modernity. These local others, often non-Western or seen as marginal to modernity, are not directly referenced as primitives or represented as such in order to avoid the evolutionary, hierarchical implications of the term. Nevertheless their alterity, symmetrically opposed to Western modernity, continues to exhibit characteristics present in earlier descriptions of primitive cultures and societies. The concept of alterity thus follows the fetishisitic logic of neo-primitivism in disavowing the primitive only to reinscribe its difference once again. 122 As we will see, in the next chapter on alterity, Jean Baudrillard not only opposes the Eurocentric representation or incorporation of the primitive, he argues that there are no longer any primitives. He remarks that the death or disappearance of primitive others like the South American Indians is not only a sign of their uncompromised alterity but also of their return as ‘viral spectral presence[s] ... [infecting] the synapses of our [Western] brains.’ 123 According to Baudrillard, then, there are no longer any primitives and precisely for that reason they continue to haunt us powerfully. Another philosopher of alterity, Jean-François Lyotard, drawing loosely on the ethnographic work of André-Marcel d’Ans, mobilizes the cultural difference of the Cashinahua, a small South American Indian tribe, to interrogate Western universal or cosmopolitical thought. But, ever alert to the dangers of ethnocentric projection, he also admits that his description of Cashinahua difference may be ‘simplistic’ and part of a tradition of Western exoticism. This autocritique of his own primitivism does not, however, prevent him from regarding the Cashinahua example as being ‘essential’ to any theoretical investigation into processes of mythic or narrative legitimation that occur in modern forms of totalitarianism. 124 Again we see a disavowal of the primitive instance followed by its reinscription as an example of alterity essential to exposing the totalitarian terror present in the metanarratives of legitimation that constitute the modern West. Thus, in Baudrillard’s and Lyotard’s work we can trace a neo-primitivist logic in which the primitive disappears as a presence to serve as an irreducible idea. Alterity is also the name that Marianna Torgovnick uses to question Western primitivism’s ethnocentric projection of its fears and desires onto primitive others. To Torgovnick, primitivism reveals more about the West than about the primitive whose alterity continues to elude and challenge Western views of the self and the world. The primitive of Western primitivism therefore does not exist or, rather, exists only as the projection of Western fantasy. But if the fantasized, projected primitive does not exist, the argument for an authentic primitive alternative to modern Western thought is promoted in Torgovnick’s work. She argues, for example, that in the oceanic experience, which Freud considered to be regressive and ‘pre-Oedipal,’ we have a primitive alternative to the modern Western separation of the self from the world. Our fascination with primitive life is thus an expression of the desire to undergo this oceanic experience in which the autonomous self is voided and merged with the entire sentient universe. 125 But, Torgovnick adds, this desire is to be found not only in primitive societies. It is a desire also present in certain religious forms and practices of the West. But this desire is more often repressed, ‘hounded out of institutionalized religions,’ and ‘projected abroad in a complicated process by which an aspect of the self was displaced onto the Other.’ 126 Even as Torgovnick incisively critiques Western primitivism’s ethnocentric construction of an exotic Other, she also asserts that ‘what has been sought elsewhere may yet be found in the folds and creases of the West’s own neglected traditions.’ 127 In short, the West’s primitive Other disappears to become the Other within the Western self. Primitive alterity is to be sought not outside but inside the West itself. In Torgovnick’s version of a primitivism without primitives, primitive others – geographically, temporally, or culturally separated from us are no longer needed because the so-called primitive quest for oceanic ecstasy is to be found as much in the West as elsewhere. We no longer need to go in search of primitives because they have been generalized or universalized to the point where we can now say, ‘primitives are us.’

#### Neo-primitivism ends up reinscribing the impacts of traditional primitivism as a grab bag of everything opposed to the modern west.

Li 06 (Victor, an award-winning multimedia journalist based in Chicago, “*The Neo-primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections on Alterity, Culture, and Modernity*,” Preface, (2006), 6/27/22 - FI)

Knowing as we do today that there have never existed peoples untouched by history, why do we continue to believe that such groups of people, by-passed by modern history, still exist? Why do we still believe in the idea of the primitive when the term ‘primitive’ itself has been increasingly withdrawn from circulation? Why still harp on the primitive when we have been made aware that primitive society was an invention of the modern West? These questions insistently frame the example that follows. In the summer of 2003, the Canadian newspaper the Globe and Mail featured in its book review section a photograph of ‘an Aboriginal group in Australia ... doing a traditional dance. Leaves are attached to their ankles and emu plumes adorn their headdresses.’ Exoticism visually established, a brief entry under the photograph summarized the contents of the book under review: ‘As the world becomes increasingly globalized and as McDonald’s [ sic ] sprouts on seemingly every corner, there are still small pockets where individual cultures and ethnic groups survive. In Living Tribes , Colin Prior gives a spectacular photographic record of fifteen such peoples, from the Inuit to the Padaung of Thailand to the Turkana of the Kenyan desert.’ 1 We will no doubt notice, especially in these politically enlightened times, that the word ‘primitive’ does not appear in the description. Instead, acceptable terms like ‘individual cultures,’ ‘ethnic groups,’ or ‘living tribes’ are used. But even though the denigration implied by evolutionary ranking is lifted when the word ‘primitive’ is studiously avoided, it is less easy to avoid the suspicion that ‘individual cultures’ or ‘ethnic groups’ may just be euphemisms inasmuch as they are still employed as concepts opposed, as ‘primitive’ once was, to a globalizing modernity. In other words, terminological replacements for ‘primitive’ remain mere euphemisms if they continue to function conceptually and rhetorically as endangered antitheses to the modern West. To be sure, unlike ‘primitive,’ which is burdened by a history of derogation, the new terms are greeted positively as expressions of cultural resistance against the threat of a homogenizing modernity, the coming of a monocultural McWorld. But the avoidance of the word ‘primitive,’ far from signifying a complete rejection of primitivism, represents instead primitivism’s transmutation into the liberal creed of multiculturalism, the preservation of cultural diversity in the age of globalization. Politically acceptable terms like ‘individual culture’ and ‘ethnic group’ may appear to oppose evolutionary narratives of primitive inferiority, but they still fall into the ‘savage slot’ that primitivism has always reserved for the Other of Euro-American modernity. 2 We should also note that the ‘primitive,’ as a chronopolitical concept, is related to terms such as the ‘premodern,’ the ‘archaic,’ and ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ societies. These terms may have different temporal inflections than ‘primitive,’ but they are often used as equivalents of the latter, especially in their perceived common opposition to the concept of modernity. Like Orientalism, primitivism functions as a grab-bag concept into which everything that is seen as opposed to the modern West is gathered. As such, any study of primitivism (and mine is no different) must acknowledge that the term ‘primitive’ lacks singular definition and possesses protean, multiple identities. The ‘primitive’ is not an ontological entity; it is a relational concept that expresses various ‘modern’ needs. The story of the ‘savage slot’ and its related manifestations is well known and has been critically analysed in such notable works as Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other , Adam Kuper’s The Invention of Primitive Society , Bernard McGrane’s Beyond Anthropology , Marianna Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive , Micaela di Leonardo’s Exotics at Home , Shelly Errington’s The Death of Authentic Primitive Art and Other Tales of Progress , Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush’s collection Prehistories of the Future , Helen Carr’s Inventing the American Primitive , Sieglinde Lemke’s Primitivist Modernism , Peter Fitzpatrick’s The Mythology of Modern Law , and Nicholas Thomas’s Colonialism’s Culture . 3 A new perspective can, nonetheless, be introduced to complicate this familiar story. Our awareness of the chronopolitics and geopolitics of primitivism, an awareness we owe in large part to the studies mentioned above, has not led to the disappearance of primitivism but to its deeper imbrication in contemporary theoretical discourses that appear to be anti-primitivist and politically progressive. 4 This book seeks to understand why primitivism keeps reappearing even after it has been uncovered as a myth, a projection, or a construction necessary for establishing the modernity of the West. It examines the ways in which a deconstructed primitivism is replaced by ‘neo-primitivism.’ By ‘neo-primitivism’ I mean the conceptual move through which the rejection of primitivism allows it to reappear in new, more acceptable forms. Neo-primitivism is a contemporary version of primitivism in which the critical repudiation of earlier primitivist discourses paradoxically enables their re-introduction, under different names and configurations to be sure, as cultural, political, ethical, and aesthetic alternatives to Western modernity. Neo-primitivist discourses, as we will see, ignore or forget their own repeated warnings against the pitfalls of earlier forms of primitivism, thereby reproducing the very same problems they have warned us against. Neo-primitivism can thus be characterized as an antiprimitivist primitivism that simultaneously disavows and reinscribes the primitive. Neo-primitivism has become an attractive theoretical option precisely at a time when ‘primitives,’ defined as belonging to authentic, primordial cultures yet untouched or uncontaminated by modernity, can no longer be called upon to act as pure forms of otherness. Nevertheless, the ‘primitive,’ as the ultimate sign of alterity, still seems to serve a useful theoretical function, though it is now conceptualized as a regulative ideal rather than as an actuality. Neo-primitivism can thus be seen as a primitivism without primitives insofar as it forwards a concept of the primitive so pure that no empirical referent or actual primitive can contradict or refute it. Though neo-primitivism questions the use of terms like ‘primitive’ and ‘primitivism,’ it continues to exhibit a deep primitivist logic that lurks in displaced but related concepts like ‘alterity,’ ‘culture,’ and, surprisingly, ‘modernity.’

# AT: Random Bataille Junk

### at: bataille

#### Bataille is an irresponsible goober, and your argument is violent cowardice

Biles 07 (Jeremy, prof of divinity at U Chicago, Ecce Monstrum: Georges Bataille and the Sacrifice of Form, 63-4)

* vtl achieved thru projects like plans

Following the publication in 1943 of Bataille's book Inner experience, Bataille and Jean-Paul Sartre engage in a brief but mordant polemical volley in which Sartre accuses Bataille of being "a new mystic." As a term of derision, "mystic' here connotes for Sartre a person who has disengaged himself from life, retreating from the crucial choices that ensure an authentic human existence. Bataille's pursuit of a "rapturous escape from the self" amounts to cowardice, flagrant irresponsibility - a failure to exercise the free involvement with the world that defines authenticity. 141 He accuses Bataille of escaping engagement, evading meaningful action. 142¶ Though Sartre does not explicitly rely on Nietzsche in formulating his philosophical response to Bataille's mystical raptures, Sartre does pressuppose a certain reading of Nietzsche, his "Great predecessor" 143 - for Nietzsche emblematizes what Sartre refers to as authenticity, the antithesis of "bad faith." Drawing from the German philosopher's emphasis on free will and overcoming, Sartre formulates his brand of existentialist philosophy around a humanistic vision in which choice (the free act of the will) allows a person to live authentically - that is, with an eye to future possibilities. Nietzsche's philosophy becomes a "call for man to choose his own life, to take responsibility for it." 144 According to Sartre, existence is absurd unless humans engage in projects through which they project themselves into the future. It is this telically oriented life that Bataille seeks to challenge. 145

#### Bataille’s aesthetics of violence culminates in fascism

Wolin 06 (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology”Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

It seems that the admiration of fascist methods - primarily with respect to¶ the ethos of unbridled transgression that was so prominent in the fascist¶ regimes’ embrace of an aesthetics of violence - evinced in Bataille’s essays¶ of the 1930s had come to the fore in a way that proved profoundly¶ embarrassing to Breton and those allied with him. In Bataille’s view, the¶ fascist revolutions in Italy and Germany were alone successful in challenging¶ the existence of the democratic spirit. They alone had replaced the decrepit¶ value-system of bourgeois society with a new collective mythology - a¶ restoration of myth that was so avidly desired by the belief-starved masses.¶ This telltale flirtation with a “left fascism” - an avowed endorsement of¶ fascist methods for left-wing political ends -was apparent from the group’s¶ inaugural manifesto of October 1935, “Contre-Attaque: Union de lutte des¶ intellectuals rkvolutionnaire.” Here, Bataille’s views played the major¶ formative role. To wit, a sanguinary fascination with revolutionary violence¶ occupied a distinct position of prominence: one of the group’s resolutions¶ emphasized that in order to insure public safety (“le salut publique”) an¶ “uncompromising dictatorship of the armed people” was required. Europe’s¶ political destiny would be determined by “the creation of a vast network of¶ disciplined and fanatical forces capable of exercising one day a merciless¶ dictatorship.” And in conclusion, the admiration for fascist ‘methods was¶ explicitly invoked: “The time has come for all of us to behave like masters¶ and to physically destroy the slaves of capitalism . . . we intend to make use¶ of the weapons created by fascism, which has known how to make use of the¶ Fundamental human aspiration for affective exaltation and fanaticism. ”75¶ The stress on revolutionary violence, on emulating an ethos of mastership,¶ The celebration of “affective exaltation and fanaticism,” of the emotional¶ side of mass politics that contemporary fascism had been able to exploit so¶ well - all represent key aspects of the ideology of left fascism as propagated¶ by Bataille at this time. As Allan Stoekl has remarked: “Effervescence, the¶ subversive violence of the masses, the baseness of their refusal to enter into¶ boring discussions - all these things, then, without a clear and correct (even¶ of boring) theory behind them, could easily be reversed into fascism, as¶ Bataille quickly became aware.”76 In the context at hand it is of more than¶ passing interest to note that the notion of a “revolt of the masters”¶ (“Herren-Aufstand”) was one of the key ideas of Ernst Jiinger’s prophetic,¶ conservative revolutionary classic, Der Arbeiter (1932) .77

#### Bataille doesn’t apply to modern capitalism, which is already based on excessive consumption and desire.

**Goux et al 90** (Jean-Joseph, the Lawrence Favrot professor of French and chair of French studies at Rice University, Kathryn Ascheim, PhD and editor of *Nature Biotech*, Rhonda Garelick, taught at Yale, University of Colorado at Boulder, and Columbia, critic of literature and politics, PhD in comparative literature, “General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism,” Yale French Studies No. 78 On Bataille, pp. 206-224)

Where do we situate Bataille’s claim? What happens to the demand of the sacred in capitalist society? How do we reconcile the affirmation that capitalism represents an unprecedented break with all archaic [precapitalist] forms of expenditure and the postulate of the necessary universality of spending as pure loss? This is the difficulty Bataille wants to maintain as a general anthropological principle the necessity of unproductive expenditure while simultaneously upholding the historic singularity of capitalism with regard to this expenditure. Bourgeois society corresponds to a “general atrophy of former sumptuary processes” (41). An anomaly whereby loss is not absent (which would contradict the general principle) but virtually unreadable: “Today, the great and free social forms of unproductive expenditure have disappeared. Nevertheless, we should not conclude from this that the very principle of expenditure is no longer situated at the end of economic activity” (37). So what happens to ostentatious expenditure in capitalism? And can we really believe, furthermore, that the even more radical desacralization effected by communism could become a libertarian affirmation of sovereignty – the feast of self-consciousness, without divinities and myths? Everything suggests that Bataille was unable to articulate the mystical tension toward sovereign self-consciousness “without form and mode,” “pure expenditure” (224) with a utopia of social life that would make it possible, nor to explain in a *developed* capitalist society the consumption of the surplus beyond its reinvestment in production. Now it is quite clear that today’s capitalism has come a long way from the Calvinist ethic that presided at its beginning. The values of thrift, sobriety, and asceticism no longer have the place that they held when Balzac could caricature the dominant bourgeois mentality with the characters of pére Grandet or the usurer Gobseck. It is doubtful that the spirit of capitalism, which according to Weber is expressed with an almost classical purity in Benjamin Franklin’s principles [“he who kills a five shilling coin assassinates all that it could have produced: entire stacks of sterling pounds”] [cited by Bataille, 163], could today be considered the spirit of the times. Undoubtedly, the pace at which all residual sacred elements inherited from feudalism are eliminated has quickened. but hasn’t contemporary society undergone a transformation of the ethic of consumption, desire, and pleasure that renders the classical [Weberian] analyses of the spirit of capitalism [to which Bataille subscribes] inadequate? If the great opposition between the sacred and the profane no longer structures social life, if communal, sacrificial, and glorious expenditure has been replaced by private expenditure, it is no less true that advanced capitalism seems to exceed the principle of restricted economy and utility that presided at its beginning. No society has “wasted” as much as contemporary capitalism. What is the form of this waste, of this excess?

#### Voting for them is a double turn

Paul Mann 99, Literature prof @ Pomona, 1999, Masocriticism, p. 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.’4 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a ‘Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his ‘Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or dépensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is the nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.